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Managerial Decision Making and Stockholder Wealth Maximization: A Limited
Dependent Variables Model of the Choice Between Dividends and Stock Repurchases
Noel Reynolds
ABSTRACT

This research attempts to provide an explanation for the firm’s choice of using either
a dividend or a stock repurchase for distributing cash to its stockholders. It also provides an
examination of the impact of the firm’s disbursement decision on the stock market’s
resulting reassessment of the value of the firm.
Before analyzing the disbursement decision, I examine the stock market effects of
dividends and stock repurchases using an event study methodology that corrects for the
possible variance change effects of cash distribution announcements. I find that the measured
wealth effects are statistically significant and similar, for the most part, to that reported in
earlier studies, notwithstanding increases in the variance of the abnormal returns distribution.
I apply LIMDEP’s full information maximum likelihood estimator (FIML) to investigate the
factors influencing a firm’s disbursement decision. I use proxies to represent the major
theories put forward in the literature to explain firms’ rationales for making cash
disbursements, namely, signaling / asymmetric information, undervaluation hypothesis,
agency theory, dividend clientele, corporate control, optimal capital structure theory,
managerial incentives hypothesis, financial flexibility and cash flow permanence.
I find that the firm’s payout choice is related to the change in annual earnings per
share, the residual volatility in daily stock returns prior to the distribution, the level of
iv

undervaluation, the free cash flows of the firm, the size of the firm, the extent of available
managerial stock options, the average dividend yield, the volatility of operating earnings,
the average daily stock return prior to announcement, the relative proportion of
permanent cash flows, and the difference in the levels of permanent cash flows pre and
post announcement.
I evaluate the stock market impact of the disbursement choice by using a selfselectivity limited-dependent variables model. The findings indicate that while open market
repurchasing firms make optimal disbursement choices, that is reflected in the reaction of the
stock market to the disbursement announcement, firms using repurchase tender offers make
disbursement decisions detrimental to the welfare of their stockholders. However, similar
results were inconclusive with regard to firms choosing to utilize dividends as their cash
payout mechanism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction

1.1

Why Study Corporate Cash Distributions to Shareholders?

Corporations in the United States utilize various mechanisms to distribute cash to
their stockholders. Firms currently use five principal methods of corporate cash distributions:
regular cash dividends, specially designated dividends, open-market stock repurchases,
intrafirm repurchase tender offers, and targeted or negotiated share repurchases. These forms
of cash payout have been the focus of numerous studies in the financial literature over the
past years.
Early theoretical work on cash distributions, for the most part, did not differentiate
between the different types of disbursements.1 For example, the agency cost motivation (to
alleviate agency problems associated with monitoring and risk aversion of managers) of
Easterbrook (1984), the cash flow signaling argument (to inform the market of an increase in
the firm's earnings) of Miller and Rock (1985), and the free cash flow theory (to reduce
agency costs associated with excess free cash flow) of Jensen (1986) apply equally to both
dividends and stock repurchases.
More recent models have considered the choice between different payout methods
and have suggested possible explanations for the form of cash distribution chosen by firms.
Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Persons (1995) suggest signaling models where the level of
1

asymmetric information (extent of undervaluation) determines the payout choice. Barclay
and Smith (1988) propose an alternative asymmetric information model that concentrates on
cost-minimization as the determining factor in the firm’s choice of the form of the payouts to
shareholders. Bagnoli, Gordon, and Lipman (1989), Denis (1990), and Bagwell (1992)
identify takeover defense as an alternative motivation for repurchases. Hausch and Seward
(1993) model the choice as one between a deterministic (dividends) and a stochastic (share
repurchases) disbursement and conclude that it depends on the form of the firm’s production
function (analogous to absolute risk aversion for a utility function). Jagannathan, Stephens,
and Weisbach (2000) and Guay and Harford (2000) hypothesize that the financial flexibility
inherent in stock repurchases contributes to the choice of payout method used by firms and
indicate that the permanence of the firm’s cash flows are important in this regard, while Fenn
and Liang (2000) examine the extent to which management stock options influence the
choice.
One question that immediately arises from examining the above motivations is
whether dividends and repurchases can be considered as true alternative forms of cash
disbursements. In this regard it is observed that the different forms of repurchases have
peculiar characteristics, as do the varying forms of dividend disbursements.
Open market repurchase programs involve firms merely announcing their intention
to buy back shares over an extended period of time at the prevailing market price. It involves
an ongoing “commitment” by the firm to make cash disbursements to its stockholders (albeit
not all stockholders). A repurchase tender offer, on the other hand, constitutes a one-time
offer by the firm to buy back stock within a specified time frame at a pre-determined price
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(or price range in the case of dutch auctions) that is usually different from the current market
price. Clearly, these two methods are distinct from the perspective of time frame, expectation
of recurrence, and concomitant cost.
An increase in the cash dividend generally involves a commitment by the firm to
maintain an increased payout over the foreseeable future2. Specially designated dividends,
instead, are usually perceived as irregular and non-routine payouts (Barclay and Smith
(1988) and Chhachhi and Davidson (1997))3. Based on these observations, the natural
comparisons seem to be open market repurchases with dividend increases (frequent, periodic
payout) and repurchase tender offers with specially designated dividends (infrequent,
irregular, non-routine payout). The appropriateness of these comparisons is supported by
recent empirical and theoretical work (for example, see Persons (1995), Stephens and
Weisbach (1996), Chhachhi and Davidson (1997), Fenn and Liang (2000), and Guay and
Harford (2000))4.
Corporate disbursements also have a significant impact on the stock markets and,
hence, stockholders’ wealth. Existing empirical studies have revealed significant stock price
reactions to announcements of unexpected corporate cash distributions (that is, dividends
and stock repurchases) [ for example, Brickley (1983); Richardson, Sefcik and Thompson
(1986); Smith (1987); Healy and Palepu (1988); Bajaj and Vijh (1990); and Stephenson
(1994)]. On average, the market’s reaction to stock repurchase announcements has been
significantly higher than the reaction to dividend announcements. The average cumulative
(3-day) abnormal return on stock repurchase announcements has been documented to be
between 5 percent and 9 percent. The corresponding excess returns for unexpected dividend
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announcements (that is, initiations, increases, and specially designated dividends) have been
observed to be between 2 percent and 3 percent.5
Notwithstanding the higher observed wealth effect associated with stock repurchase
announcements, empirical evidence shows an unexplained preference by firms for using
cash dividends (at least up to the mid 1980s).6 For example, during the period 1983 to 1986,
81 percent of all firms on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) used cash dividends while
only 14 percent of the firms made stock repurchases.7 During this period, these cash
distributions averaged $94 billion per year -- representing approximately 6 percent of the
market value of the total equity base of all the listed firms. Ofer and Thakor (1987),
pertaining to the period prior to the mid 1980s, conclude that while the majority of US firms
pay dividends, only a relatively small percentage utilizes stock repurchases.
Interestingly, in the subsequent period (post 1980s) there has been a marked decline
in the incidence of firms utilizing dividends. Concurrently, the usage of stock repurchases
has increased dramatically. Fama and French (2000) reveal that between 1978 and 1999 the
proportion of firms paying cash dividends fell from 66.5 percent to20.8 percent.
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) report quite the reverse for stock repurchases.
They indicate that between 1985 and 1996, the number of open market stock repurchase
programs announced by U.S. industrial firms increased from 115 to 755 (a 557 percent
increase) while the value of these transactions increased from $15.4 billion to $113 billion (a
634 percent increase). However, they observe that while the incidence of dividend payments
has decreased the value of these distributions continue to rise over the same period, moving
from $67.6 billion to $141 billion (a 109 percent increase). Overall, repurchases have not
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replaced dividends as the primary cash disbursement mechanism as dividends continue to be
significantly higher in value than repurchases (more than double the total value of actual
share repurchases).
Fama and French (2000), among others, surmise that since dividends are usually
taxed at a higher rate than capital gains (realized though a stock repurchase), the common
presumption is that dividends are less valuable than capital gains. Empirical evidence tends
to support this assertion as the stock price reaction and, hence, wealth impact of a stock
repurchase announcement on average exceeds the wealth impact associated with a dividend
decision (see endnote 4). Given the empirical evidence suggesting that higher wealth gains to
shareholders would result from the use of repurchases instead of dividends, the fact that
firms continue to increase the size of dividends annually and not increase repurchases at an
even faster rate indicate that dividends remain an enigma. The present research attempts to
provide some answers in this regard. The problem at hand, then, is to provide insights as to
why some firms choose to pay cash dividends while others choose to repurchase their stock,
and, consequently, whether the choice made is in the best interest of the firm’s stockholders
(that is, is it a wealth maximizing decision?). My results indicate that while open market
repurchasing firms generally are making their payout decisions in order to maximize the
returns to their stockholders (through the resulting expected stock market price reaction to
the disbursement announcement), firms using repurchase tender offers make disbursement
decisions detrimental to the welfare of their stockholders. However, similar results were
inconclusive with regard to firms choosing to utilize dividends as their form of cash
distribution.

5

Theoretical and empirical financial research related to corporate cash distributions
has focused predominantly on addressing two major issues: (i) what are the determinants of
the observed level and frequency of corporate cash distributions? and (ii) what explanations
can be put forward for the various forms of cash distributions observed in the market? A
third question, arising from the above discussion, remains unaddressed: since stock
repurchases create a greater value change in stockholders wealth, are managers maximizing
stockholders’ wealth when they use other forms of cash distributions? Interest then centers
on examining the expected impact on stockholders wealth of management’s choice of an
alternative distribution method. That is, for firms that used cash dividends (stock
repurchases) as their method of cash distribution, what would have been the stock price
reaction had they instead decided to repurchase their stock (pay dividends)?
This empirical question, however, cannot be answered by merely assuming that the
average wealth effect associated with repurchases would in fact result for a dividend
increasing firm that decided to switch distribution methods. It in fact introduces an
econometric problem of self-selection. If the choice to belong to one group or another is a
function of the expected benefits of belonging to the group, then the data exhibits a
selectivity bias and valid conclusions can only be drawn by incorporating the choice process
explicitly in the empirical model specification. This has previously been ignored in the
literature and is addressed in my estimation procedures.
The focus of this study, then, is to fill the gap in the existing literature by empirically
examining the stockholder wealth maximization impact of management’s disbursement
choices, thereby supplementing and extending current research in this area. In this research, I
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examine the determinants of the choice between dividends and stock repurchases and the
impact of that choice on the stockholders’ wealth position. The expectation is that even in
the presence of asymmetric information, agency costs, and differing expected stock price
reactions to the various mechanisms of cash disbursements, firms, on average, choose the
cash distribution method that maximizes the expected gain associated with the distribution.
Hence, managers, on average, make stockholder wealth maximizing disbursement choices
(that is, the disbursement choice is made with reference to the expected excess returns
generated on announcement of the decision). My results find support for this proposition
only with regard to firms utilizing open market stock repurchases, notwithstanding the
influence of other factors on the decision.
A caveat is in order: while I draw on a broad cross-section of theoretical
underpinnings (for example, asymmetric information/signaling, agency costs, free cash flow,
cash flow permanence, and financial flexibility) in developing my empirical model, the tests
utilized in addressing my primary hypothesis are not designed to differentiate between the
effects of these various theories. Further, it is not my intent to test all the possible proxies for
the variables identified and utilized in the model. I am primarily concerned with the
relationship between the firm’s cash disbursement choice (dividend versus stock repurchase)
and the impact of that choice on share prices. Therefore, I employ variables from two strands
of the cash disbursement literature (not necessarily independent) that have been used in
previous studies to explain the disbursement choice and the magnitude of the associated
wealth effects.
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1.2

Specific Purpose of This Research

In a perfect capital market, the manager's choice of a disbursement method would
be irrelevant. Under such conditions, there would exist no market frictions, investors
would have perfect information, and, hence, the form of the distribution chosen by
management would have no impact on the value of the firm. In this situation, dividends
would be equivalent to stock repurchases.8
Given, however, that market imperfections do exist, the impact of a firm’s choice
of distribution method is non-trivial. In fact, the choice facing managers is one that has
implications for the value of their firm. For example, Fama and French (2000) indicate
that due to tax implications, firms that pay dividends are at a competitive disadvantage
since they have a higher cost of equity than firms that use stock repurchases. In addition,
Persons (1995) points out that while the administrative expenses associated with paying a
dividend are inconsequential, repurchases usually involve substantial transactions costs.
Hence, with taxes, transactions costs, and asymmetric information, the firm’s choice of a
payout method is an important decision with resultant valuation implications.
With the plethora of theoretical and empirical financial research relating firm
characteristics to the valuation impact (excess stock market returns) of cash distribution
announcements (for example, Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1984), Miller and Rock (1985),
John and Williams (1985), Jensen (1986), Bajaj and Vijh (1990), Denis, Denis, and Sarin
(1994), Chhachhi and Davidson (1997), Guay and Harford (2000), among others), it
would seem an easy task to assess the opportunity cost of a particular disbursement
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choice (that is, the difference between the expected wealth impact of the method used and
that of an alternative method). However, if indeed firms make the disbursement choice on
the basis of value maximization, the issue is much more complicated because the
disbursement choice would then be endogenized; that is, the wealth effect associated with
a particular choice of cash distribution would be directly related to the choice model
itself. This introduces the econometric issue of self-selectivity bias (or simply selfselection) mentioned earlier. In this case, correct specification of the expected wealth
impact of an alternative cash payout method would require joint modeling of the
disbursement choice equation and the wealth effects models for both alternative payout
methods. This issue has not previously been addressed in the finance literature and serves
as the major contribution of the present research. Results indicate that a selectivity bias
should be accounted for as self-selection is a characteristic of the cash distribution
sample.
This study focuses, therefore, on the firm’s choice of cash payout method and the
impact of this choice on the firm’s stock price. The underlying premise is that the
disbursement decision is taken to maximize the net benefit (or minimize the net cost) to
stockholders where this benefit is measured by the excess stock market returns generated
on announcement of the disbursement decision. I empirically model the manager’s choice
problem -- determining whether to disburse cash as a dividend or a stock repurchase –
and the related benefit arising from the choice (the stock market excess returns associated
with the particular payout method chosen) by application of a limited dependent variable
methodology, specifically a self-selectivity model, to account for the endogeneity of the
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disbursement choice. The approach involves defining the structural model derived from
the theoretical arguments above – that is, the three equations model describing (i) the
firm’s choice of a payout method, and (ii) the benefits (excess stock market returns)
model for each alternative payout method. The structural probit equations are then
transformed to a reduced form model (by specifically accounting for the relationships
between the equations) and solved by a full information maximum likelihood estimation
procedure. The discriminatory variables that I use in the model are defined and explained
in the methodology section of Chapter 3 of this study. As discussed earlier, I employ
variables that have been used in previous studies related to cash distribution policy. They
are based on corporate financial theory in the areas of asymmetric information
(signaling), agency cost, free cash flow, financial flexibility, corporate control, and
optimal capital structure.
Employing a self-selectivity model recognizes and adjusts for the selection bias that
may be inherent in earlier studies that ignore the fact that firms may be “non-randomly”
included in their sample. If indeed firms choose a particular disbursement method only when
it is optimal (that is, in the best interests of the firm’s stockholders), then they are said to
have self-selected within the sample.
The self-selection arises because the choice of a cash distribution method and the
resulting economic variable being analyzed (the excess returns around the announcement of
the disbursement) are jointly determined by a common set of factors. As a result the error
terms in the functional relationships explaining the disbursement choice and the excess stock
returns would be correlated and have non-zero expectations. Where self-selection exists and
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is not corrected, this non-random sample selection process potentially leads to biased
inferences from the study undertaken, since the regression models estimated using ordinary
least squares could result in inefficient and inconsistent estimates.

1.3

Important Contributions of This Research

The primary contribution of this study is the use of a self-selectivity model to
identify whether firms are making disbursement decisions that maximize their stockholders’
wealth. This study is the first attempt, to my knowledge, to address this issue. The research
results suggest that the major factors affecting the firm’s choice of using either a dividend or
a stock repurchase to make cash distributions are stockholder wealth maximization and
issues of asymmetric information, signaling, undervaluation, agency, financing cost,
managerial incentives, clientele, financial flexibility, and cash flow permanence.
By operating in an integrated framework, that is, by jointly examining the stock
market’s reactions to dividend and repurchase announcements, the research is able to
account for any potential self-selectivity bias that may have been overlooked in previous
research. The primary methodology used in examining the information effects of the
dividend and stock repurchase announcements is an event study. The research finds that selfselection bias is a critical factor (primarily with regard to stock repurchasing firms) in
studying the motivations for firms’ disbursement choices. Firms do not appear to randomly
choose between the various disbursement methods. Rather, the observed choice is the result
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of a deliberate decision made by the firm (generally in the interest of maximizing the wealth
position of its stockholders).
The remainder of this research paper is organized as follows. I provide in Chapter 2 a
more detailed treatment of the theories related to corporate cash disbursements. I define in
Chapter 3 the factors used in my model and discuss the methodology applied in the research,
as well as indicate my data sources and outline the hypotheses that are examined. Chapter 4
then provides the results of the study and presents an interpretation of these results in the
present research context. A summary of the research concludes the study in Chapter 5.

12

Chapter 2
Review of Related Literature

In this chapter I provide a detailed examination of the current literature in finance,
both theoretical and empirical, as related to both the differing motivations posited as
explanations of the varying forms of cash disbursements considered and the factors
impacting the choice between disbursement methods.
In order to provide a more structured survey and to facilitate application to the
present research, this survey of the literature is presented with reference to disbursement
type. The first and second sub-sections review empirical and theoretical research related to
dividend disbursements and stock repurchases respectively. In examining the literature
related to dividend disbursements, I also separately consider the theoretical motivations
posited for dividend increases and specially designated dividends. In the third sub-section I
summarize existing research that considers the choice between different payout methods.
Additionally, since the decision to begin paying dividends involves other
confounding factors, for the purpose of this study dividend disbursements focus only on
dividend increases and special dividends. Dividend initiations are not considered.

13

2.1

Dividend Theories

2.1.1

Theoretical Motivations for Dividend Increases

Three main theoretical arguments are presented in the literature to explain why
managers make distributions in the form of dividend payments. These are (i) the cash flow
signaling hypothesis, (ii) resolution of agency conflicts, and (iii) the taxation clientele
hypothesis.

2.1.1.1 Cash Flow Signaling. Modigliani and Miller (1964) provide the foundation for the
signaling argument, as related to managers’ decisions to increase dividends, by positing that
managers will increase the firm’s dividend payout only when they believe the firm can
sustain the increased payments over the foreseeable future. This is so because they are
reluctant to cut dividends, as the market penalizes the firm severely for so doing (empirical
studies, e.g. Lintner (1956), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Kwan (1981) support the
observation that the stock market reacts more negatively to an unexpected dividend cut than
it does positively to an unexpected dividend increase of the same proportion).
The cash flow signaling arguments are based on the work of Bhattacharya (1979)
and Miller and Rock (1985) and posit that, in markets with asymmetric information,
managers of firms with high earnings prospects signal this information to the market by
paying cash dividends. The signal becomes credible because less profitable firms are not
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able to mimic the signal and adopt such a policy, due to the high opportunity cost of
foregone investments.
The major signaling costs in Bhattacharya (1979), that lead dividends to function as a
signal of expected cash flows, arise from the assumption made that dividends are taxed at a
higher rate than capital gains. He develops a tax-based signaling cost model in an
intertemporal setting, enabling the identification of the relative weights placed on the
benefits (derives from the rise in liquidation value caused by a committed, and actually paid,
dividend level) and costs (tax-cost ensuing because cash payouts in the form of dividends are
assumed to be taxed at a higher personal tax rate than capital gains) of signaling with
dividends. Under these conditions, it is shown that dividends function as a signal of expected
future cash flows. One other interesting result of the model is that the shorter the horizons
over which shareholders have to realize their wealth, the higher is the equilibrium proportion
of dividends to expected earnings.
Miller and Rock (1985) evaluate announcement effects and their consequences under
conditions of asymmetric information (where the firm’s managers are assumed to know
more than outside investors about the true state of the firm’s current earnings) using a twoperiod, one decision, no-tax, uncertainty model of the firm’s combined dividend, investment,
and financing decision. Their model is based on the familiar cash flow identity, namely, that
the sources of funds to the firm (earnings plus financing) must be equal to its uses of funds
(dividends plus investment). Given that the investment and financing decisions are known
(or fixed), they show that in a world of rational expectations, the firm’s dividend
announcements provide just enough pieces of the firm’s sources and uses statement for the
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market to deduce the unobserved piece, that is, the firm’s current earnings. The dividend
announcement conveys information indirectly, and need not represent any deliberate attempt
by the managers of the firm to reveal their private information. The dividend announcement
merely provides the market with the missing piece of the cash flow identity that allows the
market to estimate the firm’s current earnings. It is then the earnings estimate, rather than the
dividend itself, that the market utilizes to estimate the expected future earnings, and thereby
the firm’s market value. Dividends can, therefore, by this indirect route, acquire an important
informational signal content.
John and Williams (1985) also present a similar model to Miller and Rock (1985), in
the framework of a signaling equilibrium, where they show that firms with more favorable
inside information optimally pay higher dividends and receive appropriately higher prices
for their stock. In their model, taxes are paid only on dividends, no transaction costs are
incurred when issuing, retiring, or trading shares, and all sources and uses of the firms’ funds
are fully observed by outsiders through costless public audits. They show that under these
circumstances, corporate insiders distribute taxable dividends, which the market interprets as
a dissipative signal, if and only if the demand for cash by both the firm and its current
stockholders exceeds the supply of internal funds. The intuition behind their signaling
equilibrium lies in the fact that current stockholders will suffer some dilution in their
fractional ownership of the firm when the firm needs to raise investment funds (by selling
new shares or retiring fewer outstanding shares), or the current stockholders need to raise
cash on personal account (by selling existing shares). Reducing this dilution will be more
valuable to current stockholders when their private information is more favorable. Hence,
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insiders, acting in their stockholders best interests, may distribute a taxable dividend if
outside investors recognize this relationship, bid up the stock price, and thereby reduce
current stockholders’ dilution.
A number of empirical papers have appeared in the literature providing support for
the cash flow signaling argument. Ofer and Siegel (1987) document significant analyst
forecast revisions following dividend changes and indicate that this evidence lends support
to the information signaling hypothesis.
Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994), integrate the cash flow signaling, free-cash flow /
agency cost, and clientele hypotheses in a single testing framework and find support for the
cash flow signaling argument. They use a standard event study methodology with market
model coefficients to calculate the two day excess returns around the dividend change
announcement. The data sample consisted of 6,777 dividend change announcements of at
least 10 percent (5,992 dividend increases and 785 dividend decreases) made by
NYSE/AMEX firms over the period 1962-1988. Their sample exhibited a significant twoday announcement period excess returns of 1.25 percent for dividend increases and –5.71
percent for dividend decreases. Using a cross-sectional multiple regression model to
simultaneously control for the standardized dividend change, dividend yield, and Tobin’s Q,
they find that announcement period excess returns are positively related to the magnitude of
the standardized dividend change and to the dividend yield, but unrelated to Tobin’s Q. They
provide further evidence on the signaling argument by showing that analysts significantly
revise their earnings forecasts (using a moving average technique to estimate the unexpected
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revision in analysts’ earnings per share forecasts) following dividend changes9 and that Q<1
firms actually increase their capital expenditures following dividend increases.
An alternative signaling hypothesis presented by Grullon, Michaely, and
Swaminathan (1999) is that dividend increases signal a firm’s long-term transition from
growth phase to a more mature phase (with a resultant decrease in systematic risk). Using a
sample of 7,642 dividend changes announced between 1968 and 1993 they find that firms
that increase dividends experience a significant decline in their systematic risk (as measured
by changes in the factor loadings from the Fama-French (1993) three factor model) and that
the positive market reaction to the announced dividend increase is related to the decline in
systematic risk.

2.1.1.2 Resolving Agency Conflicts: The general arguments presented in these theories are
that by increasing dividend payments firms help to mitigate agency problems existing
between managers and shareholders. The specific mechanism by which this is accomplished
differs, however, among the various models.
Rozeff (1982) presents an ownership structure hypothesis suggesting that the
characteristics of a firm's stockholdings significantly impact its optimal financial policies,
implying that firms which initiate dividend payments should either have lower insider
shareholdings or have experienced a larger reduction in insider shareholdings since their
initial offering, than comparable non-dividend paying firms. Newly public firms maintaining
a cohesive ownership structure -- with high levels of insider and/or institutional
shareholdings – are assumed to generate few agency costs by nature, as ownership and
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control are tightly integrated (hence, agency problems are deemed to arise as a direct result
of the separation of ownership and control). These firms are thus unlikely to initiate or
increase dividend payments (for the purpose of resolving agency conflicts). The reverse also
holds true -- the lack of a compact structure induces agency costs due to the separation of
ownership and control of the firm, and dividends are used by the firm to alleviate these costs.
Easterbrook (1984) hypothesizes that dividends serve as a means of inducing
managers to more frequently raise funds from the public capital market -- where monitoring
and control activities can be more effectively enacted -- thus alleviating agency problems
associated with monitoring costs and risk aversion on the part of managers. This is so
because dividends dissipate the firm’s supply of internally generated funds (cash) and induce
firms to float new securities to generate funds for investment projects. His capital market
monitoring theory implies that firms that use dividend payments to alleviate serious agency
problems, as related to the above, should subsequently issue debt and/or equity securities
more frequently than comparable non-dividend firms.
Jensen (1986) posits that a firm with free cash flow, that is, cash flow in excess of
that necessary to fund all available positive net present value projects, should experience a
positive stock market reaction to an increase in its dividend payment. His argument is
founded on the premise that payouts to shareholders reduce the resources under managers’
control, thereby reducing managers’ power, and making it more likely they will incur the
monitoring of the capital markets which occurs when the firm must obtain new capital
(similar to the argument of Easterbrook (1984) above). Free cash flow in the hands of
managers generates agency costs as managers have incentives to expend funds on perquisites
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or sub-optimal investments and acquisitions, rather than making payments to shareholders.
Their willingness to relinquish control of free cash flow -- by distributing dividends –
therefore indicates their commitment to acting in shareholders best interests, hence a
reduction in agency costs and an increase in shareholder wealth.
The empirical findings tend to lend some measure of support for the agency cost
resolution theories. In their study, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) document the existence of a
strong relationship between the generation of excess free cash flow and the decision by firms
to begin paying dividends. They suggest that unexpected dividend change announcements by
“overinvestor” firms (that is, those firms that invest in negative net present value (NPV)
projects) convey information regarding the firms’ future investment levels. A dividend
increase suggests that the firm will invest less in the future than was expected. This will be
interpreted favorably by the market since the firm was expected to have invested in negative
NPV projects otherwise. Using Tobin’s Q as an indicator of the profitability of new
investment opportunities they find that firms with Q<1 have greater price reactions, on
average, to dividend changes than do Q>1 firms.
Additionally, in the agency theory realm, Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984)
hypothesize that managers may use dividend increases as a mechanism to redistribute wealth
from bondholders to stockholders. This “wealth redistribution” hypothesis states that
unexpected dividend increases would transfer wealth from the bondholders to the
equityholders if the dividends are financed by issuing new debt at equal or higher seniority
than outstanding debt, or by reducing investment outlays. The wealth redistribution results
from the increase in the risk of the firm’s currently outstanding bonds that accompany the
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two aforementioned mechanisms (debt-financed or investment-financed dividends). The
implication of this is that the positive (negative) impact of dividend announcements on stock
prices should be accompanied by negative (positive) effects on the bond prices.
They tested their hypothesis by examining 255 bonds chosen randomly from NYSE
firms announcing dividend payments during 1975 to 1976 (the 255 sample firms made 1,967
dividend announcements over the period). They used the mean-adjusted returns model of
Brown and Warner (1980) to estimate the bond price effects (excess returns) for the day 0
and 30-day (–15 to +15) announcement period windows. Their results indicated that bond
prices are not affected by dividend increases but react negatively to dividend reductions.
This finding thus contradicted their wealth redistribution hypothesis and instead supported
the information signaling hypothesis for dividend announcements.

2.1.1.3 Taxation Clienteles. The body of literature in this section is based on the hypothesis
that high income tax bracket investors will tend to prefer low dividend yield stocks, with the
reverse also holding true. Elton and Gruber (1970) provide support for this argument by
documenting a positive correlation between the dividend yield of securities and the
proportionate size of their relative ex-dividend price drop. They also show that the exdividend price drop is smaller than the dividend per share, which infers a tax effect.
Bajaj and Vijh (1990) suggest dividend clienteles as a partial explanation of the
observed stock price reaction to dividend change announcements. They theorize that the
price reaction is influenced by the yield preferences of the marginal investor in the firm’s
shares. Hence, the market reaction to the announcement will be related to the firm’s dividend
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yield, that is, dividend-yield surprises will be perfectly correlated with dividend surprises.
They examine 1,188 dividend decreases and 7,322 dividend increases between 1962 and
1987 for firms listed on the 1987 CRSP daily master file (NYSE and AMEX stocks), and use
the market model to measure the cumulative abnormal returns for the 3-day period (-1 to +1)
around the dividend announcement, splitting the sample into three sub-groups of high,
medium, and low dividend yield firms. Using the firm’s preannouncement yield as a proxy
for the market’s anticipated yield, they find that the magnitude of the stock price reaction to
the dividend change announcement is greater the higher the anticipated yield (their average
3-day CAR around dividend increase announcements was statistically significant at 1.04
percent for the entire sample). Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) provide similar
evidence by examining the relationships between firms’ stock prices and their respective
dividend yields.10
Kalay (1982) attempts to refute these arguments by showing that marginal tax rates
cannot be inferred from the existing data without additional information. However, after
adjusting for the dual potential biases in the earlier research, his results remain "consistent"
with a tax effect. Barclay (1987) provides strong rebuttal for the taxation clientele
hypothesis, providing documentary evidence that taxes are not a primary factor in the
dividend decision -- since dividends were in fact being paid before they were subject to
taxation and continued to be popular thereafter.
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2.1.2

Theoretical Motivations for Specially Designated Dividends

Two major arguments are presented with respect to theoretical justification for
specially designated dividends (SDDs). As suggested from the earlier discussion in chapter
1, these are similar to the explanations for regular dividends, namely cash flow signaling and
agency cost resolution (specifically free cash flow hypothesis).

2.1.2.1 Cash Flow Signaling. Theory would suggest that the labeling of dividends as
"special", "extra", or "year-end" conveys information to the market about future earnings and
dividends. Financial texts suggest that special dividends convey information that is of a
"temporary" or "transitory", rather than permanent, nature -- indicating a lower probability
(as compared to regular dividend increases) of the "increase" being sustained. Brickley
(1983) reveals that SDDs provide positive but "weaker" information than regular dividends.
He concludes that SDDs provide information of more than a transitory or temporary nature -information that is not obviously differentiated from that provided by regular dividend
increases. Jayaraman and Shastri (1988) show that the level of information conveyed by
SDDs is negatively related to the frequency of the dividend. They find no evidence of
bondholder wealth expropriation -- the gains accrue solely to shareholders. Howe, He, and
Kao (1992) also provide indirect support for the signaling hypothesis. They find no
significant difference in stock price reactions to SDDs for high Tobin's-Q (valuemaximizers) versus low Tobin's-Q (overinvestors) firms.
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2.1.2.2 Resolving Agency Conflicts (Free Cash Flow Theory). This is essentially the
Jensen argument presented in the other dividend sections -- this theory cannot discriminate
among the different forms of dividend payments cited. Further support for this explanation is
provided by Kanatas and Ofer (1992) who develop a model showing that a one-time
payment (SDDs) does not provide sufficient information necessary to induce appropriate
managerial effort, thereby minimizing agency problems.

2.2

Stock Repurchases Theories - Open Market and Tender Offers

2.2.1

Information Signaling Hypothesis

The signaling hypothesis theorizes that a firm's management will repurchase its
shares if it is believed the stock represents a good investment, that is, signaling to the market
that the shares are undervalued and/or that the firm's prospects -- cash flow, earnings, and
risk -- are positive. The cost to signal such information is, however, not the same for all
firms. In fact, firms without such positive information will have a much higher signaling
cost, and this prevents such firms from sending false signals. To be a valid signal,
management must commit not to sell its own shares back to the firm during the repurchase
program.11 The signal becomes credible because the managers would then be acting against
their own best interests to falsely signal positive information while at the same time retain
their own shares in the firm.
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Vermaelen (1981) examined this proposal by observing the pricing behavior of
securities of firms repurchasing their own shares. His results provide support for the
signaling hypothesis and he concludes:
"...firms offer premia for their own shares mainly in order to signal positive
information...the market uses the premium, the target fraction, and the fraction of
insider holdings as signals in order to price securities around the announcement
date."
Additional support for signaling, as applied to stock repurchase announcements, has
been provided by Klein and Rosenfeld (1988), Hertzel and Jain (1991), Bartov (1991), and
Tsetsekos (1993), among others.

2.2.2

Leverage / Optimal Capital Structure Hypothesis

The theory developed here has its foundation in theoretical models developed by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) reflecting the valuation
effects of capital structure changes. The hypothesis states that a corporation's managers
provide information that the firm is moving closer to its optimal capital structure -- replacing
equity with tax-deductible debt -- by repurchasing the company's shares.
Jensen and Meckling (1976) model agency costs for the firm characterized by a
separation of ownership and control, and show that these costs (monitoring and bonding
expenditures and the residual loss from investment decisions of managers) are reduced by
the existence of risky debt in the firm’s capital structure. Monitoring provided by
debtholders results in the firm’s total monitoring costs being less when both debt and equity
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financing comprise the firm’s capital structure, than for the firm being fully equity financed.
Thus, some proportion of debt financing will be necessary to minimize total agency costs
and thereby maximize firm value. Hence, a firm with a lower proportion of debt than the
level required to minimize total agency costs will benefit from an increase in leverage.
DeAngelo and Masulis provide evidence that builds on the earlier work of
Modigliani and Miller (1963) that an increase in corporate debt provides increased taxdeductible interest payments, thereby increasing the firm’s debt tax shield and hence the
value of the firm. They show that individual tax preferences against debt -- that treat equity
income more favorably than debt income -- diminish but do not completely offset the
corporate advantage of debt.
Empirical analysis of this position has been provided by Masulis (1980b), who
considered the impact of capital structure change announcements on security prices and
reported significant price adjustments in firms' common stock, preferred stock, and debt
related to these announcements. His results are consistent with both the leverage hypothesis
and the wealth expropriation hypothesis discussed below. The work of Smith (1987) also
provides support for a leverage or tax effect.

2.2.3

Wealth Expropriation Hypothesis

The argument posited here is that since repurchasing stock reduces the assets of the
firm and increases its leverage, thus reducing the safety of outstanding debt, it thereby
transfers wealth from the corporate debtholders to the shareholders -- an effect similar to that
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produced by spin-offs, as documented by Galai and Masulis (1976) -- if debtholders are not
completely protected by covenants.
This idea has been advanced by Masulis (1980a) and Dann (1981) but has not
received strong empirical support. Dann finds no significant loss in wealth being suffered by
bondholders upon a repurchase announcement, while Masulis (1980b) finds that only
debtholders devoid of complete covenant protection against the issue of subsequent debt
instruments -- equal or senior standing -- experience significant negative returns.

2.2.4

Agency Cost & Free Cash Flow Theory

Again, this is Jensen's argument that distributing excess free cash flow -- in this case
a current accumulation that is not necessarily expected to continue in the future -- signals to
the market management's acting in the best interests of shareholders by relinquishing control
of such free cash flow, thereby reducing agency costs. Jensen's theory is unable to
discriminate among the various forms of corporate cash disbursement policies and is equally
applicable to dividends and repurchases. Vermaelen's (1984) results provide additional
tentative support for the hypothesis that stock prices reflect adverse managerial incentives.

2.2.5

Corporate Control Hypothesis

In addition to the traditional motivations presented above, more recent research has
focused on the use of stock repurchases as a mechanism of corporate control. Bagnoli,
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Gordon, and Lipman (1989) present a model with stock repurchases serving as a defense
against takeovers by signaling managers' private information about the value of the firm.
Denis (1990) and Bagwell (1992) also identify takeover defense as an alternative motivation
for repurchases.
Sinha (1991) uses repurchases as a mechanism for disciplining managers to act in
shareholders best interests. A debt-financed repurchase, through the threat of bankruptcy and
the subsequent loss of perquisites, ensures that managers carry out investments that increase
firm value. The optimal mix of investment and debt-financed repurchase is determined by a
trade-off between the benefits of a reduced probability of takeover and the cost of an
increased probability of bankruptcy.

2.3

Studies Incorporating Both Disbursement Types

There exists a paucity of financial research examining firms’ choice of disbursement
mode in an integrated framework. Most of the work to date has focused not on developing a
choice model but instead on postulating a cost-benefit analysis for the choice and examining
the stock market’s reaction to one type of disbursement conditioned by the firm’s prior use
of other types.
Ofer and Thakor (1987) were perhaps the first to examine the interaction of
dividends and stock repurchases by exploring the informational roles of both simultaneously.
They develop a joint dissipative signaling model in which managers transmit their privately
held information through both corporate cash-distribution methods. Managers are thus able
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to signal the true value of their firms by using either a dividend, a stock repurchase, or both.
The central assumption of their model that creates a signaling-cost structure difference
between dividends and repurchases is that managers are excluded from tendering in a
repurchase -- an assumption that has been supported in the empirical literature. Additionally,
they require a managerial incentive contract necessary to provide the manager a reason to
signal: one such that a nontrivial component of the manager’s compensation is driven
positively by the postsignal value of the firm. From their model, they show that both
dividends and repurchases will generally be used as signals and neither dominates under all
circumstances. They were also able to rationalize and explain why a stock repurchase elicits
a significantly higher average stock market reaction than a dividend announcement.
However, as per their own conclusion, their model “seems particularly suited to relatively
small firms in which insiders can be expected to have sizable stock holdings.”12
Barclay and Smith (1988) approach the choice between dividends and repurchases
from a cost minimization perspective. To explain the empirically documented overwhelming
use of cash dividends by firms, they argue that there exists a previously unrecognized cost
associated with open-market repurchases that does not arise with dividend payments. Their
information-asymmetry hypothesis posits that more trading by informed managers increases
the bid-ask spread, reduces the liquidity of the firm’s shares, and thereby increases the firm’s
cost of capital -- hence reducing its market value. This liquidity cost arises since the
specialist, on observing additional informed traders entering the market, finds that he no
longer covers the opportunity cost of his time and invested capital at the current bid-ask
spread. Since these costs of repurchases do not arise with cash dividends, their analysis
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implies that repurchases do not dominate dividends as a form of making cash distributions to
shareholders.
Hausch and Seward (1993) provide a more esoteric signaling model to determine a
firm’s choice between stock repurchases and dividends. They consider the manager’s
problem of selecting a cash distribution method as the choice between deterministic and
stochastic disbursements. Their model is, however, a univariate signaling model and, as
such, they are not able to explain why firms utilize different forms of stochastic distributions.
Their study concludes that the firm’s choice of a deterministic or stochastic distribution
depends on a property of the firm’s production function that is analogous to absolute risk
aversion for the utility function. The high quality firm prefers to signal quality with a
stochastic (deterministic) disbursement when there is decreasing (increasing) absolute risk
aversion.
Fama and French (2000) examined the incidence of dividend payers among NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ firms over the period 1926-99. They reveal that while the proportion
of firms paying cash dividends increased from 33.6 percent to more than 90 percent between
1933 and 1962, the proportion of firms paying cash dividends fell from 66.5percent to 20.8
percent between 1978 and 1999. They conclude that this is due partly to the changing
characteristics of publicly traded firms, with a shift towards small firms with low
profitability and strong growth opportunities. However, even after controlling for these
factors they find that firms have, over the sample period, exhibited a lower propensity to pay
dividends (that is, a declining likelihood of paying dividends). This they interpret to mean
that the perceived benefits of dividends decline through time.
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Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) examine the growth in open market
repurchases and the determinants of payout policy from a sample of repurchase programs
announced between 1985 and 1996. They indicate that between this period the number of
open market stock repurchase programs announced by U.S. industrial firms increased from
115 to 755 (a 650 percent increase) while the value of these transactions increased from
$15.4 billion to $113 billion (a 750 percent increase). However, they observe that while the
incidence of dividend payments has decreased the value of these distributions continue to
rise over the same period, moving from $67.6 billion to $141 billion (a 109 percent
increase). Their primary hypothesis is that dividends represent an ongoing commitment and
are used to distribute permanent cash flows, while repurchases are used to pay out cash flows
that are potentially temporary. Their empirical evidence indicates that stock repurchases are
used by firms with higher “temporary” non-operating cash flows, greater earnings volatility,
and following poor stock market performance. On the other hand, firms tend to increase
dividends following good performance and when they have higher “permanent” operating
cash flows.
Guay and Harford (2000) arrive at similar conclusions to Jagannathan, Stephens, and
Weisbach (2000), but use a different empirical approach. They reiterate that cash-flow
shocks preceding a dividend increase will have a larger permanent component than that
preceding a repurchase and that the market uses the firm’s payout choice to update its belief
about the permanence of cash-flow shocks.
Fenn and Liang (2000) examine the effect of managerial stock incentives on
corporate payout policy using a sample of 1,108 non-financial firms listed in the S&P 500,
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S&P Midcap 400, or S&P Smallcap 600 indices. They find that managerial stock options are
related to the composition of cash payouts. In particular, their empirical evidence shows a
negative relationship between dividends and the level of management stock options and a
positive relationship between repurchases and the level of management stock options. They
conclude that the growth in managerial stock options partially explains the increase in
repurchases relative to dividends.

2.4

Summary

The literature on corporate payout policy is extensive. In my survey I have
concentrated primarily on the two strands relevant to the research question being considered.
On the one hand, I have considered various viewpoints as to the important factors associated
with the magnitude of the stock price announcement effects related to corporate cash
disbursements. Our discussion indicates that among the relevant factors in this regard would
be the size of the firm, the level of asymmetric information (incorporating earnings and
systematic risk expectations), the prior dividend yield (representing the clientele effect), the
level of free cash flows (potential for reduction of agency costs), and the current debt level of
the firm (purported by the optimal capital structure hypothesis).
On the other hand, I have focused my attention on the factors that have been
theorized and empirically examined as having an impact on the choice of corporate payout
method (repurchases or dividends). Our review suggests that the level of asymmetric
information, extent of undervaluation in the firm’s stock price, financial flexibility inherent
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in the firm ( measured by the permanence of the firm’s cash flows, the volatility of its
earnings, and the prior market performance of its stock), the extent of available managerial
stock options, the level of its free cash flows (and associated agency costs), and the existence
of hostile takeover attempts facing the firm are the factors influencing the choice.
As I develop my empirical model in the next chapter proxies for these variables will
be applied in examining the research question posited and will form the basis of our
conclusions developed in the context of the statistical testing of that model.
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Chapter 3
Research Design

3.1

Specific Hypothesis Considered

The design of the present research and the methodologies applied therein take into
account the factors discussed earlier in Chapters 1 and 2. The main purpose of the research is
to investigate whether managers’ choices between dividends and stock repurchases as
alternative payout methods are value maximizing from the perspective of the firm’s
stockholders.
The specific hypothesis that I examine may be stated as:

Ho:

Managers do not discriminate in their choice of a payout method.

Ha:

Managers discriminate between dividends and repurchases by
maximizing the expected abnormal returns following the
disbursement announcement.

The validity of the hypothesis is examined in two stages. First, relevant variables are
extracted from the literature as it relates to motivations for cash disbursements and these are
utilized in jointly estimating (using a self-selectivity modeling approach) the manager’s
disbursement decision and the resulting stock market excess returns around the
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announcement of the decision. In step two I examine what the expected excess returns would
have been had the alternate choice been made by the manager and then conclude whether the
choice was a stockholder wealth maximizing one.

3.2

Methodology Development and Determination of Test Statistics

From the earlier discussions in chapter 1 of this study the decision between stock
repurchases and dividends is looked at in two regards. These are the choices between:
1. Dividend Increases and Open Market Stock Repurchases, and
2. A Specially Designated Dividend and a Repurchase Tender Offer.
In modeling the above choices I apply a limited dependent variables estimation
technique known as self-selectivity. Self-selectivity implies that firms are not indifferent in
choosing to distribute cash to their stockholders in the form of dividends or stock
repurchases. Rather, the observed choice of disbursement method is the result of a deliberate
and specific decision made by the firm. According to Maddala (1991):
“The self-selection model is based on the idea that individuals choose one of two
groups on the basis of expected benefits from belonging to the two groups.
…Sometimes the benefits can be captured by the stock price…”
As such, the observed cross-sectional “informational” effect is conditional on the
choices made. Therefore, I would not expect the same average effect to be observed for firms
choosing to engage in either event. The process generating observed abnormal stock market
returns is thus modeled as a “switching regression model with endogenous switching”,13
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requiring the researcher to simultaneously estimate: (i) the unconditional cross-sectional
announcement period cumulative abnormal return experienced for each event type, (ii) the
decision process adopted by the firm in choosing between the different methods of
disbursement, and (iii) the impact of the firm’s choice of disbursement type on the observed
announcement period cumulative abnormal returns.
Our foundational premise is that a firm, having decided to distribute cash to its
stockholders, will make a dividend payment only if the net gain from this option is greater
than the gain arising from a stock repurchase. That is, dividends will be used as the cash
disbursement choice if

(VDi − V0i ) − (VRi − V0i ) > C Di − C Ri

(1)

where VDi and VRi are the values of the firm after making the dividend payment or
stock repurchase, respectively, V0i is the value of the firm before making the cash
distribution, and CDi and CRi are the respective costs associated with the dividend
payment or the stock repurchase. If we standardize all variables in terms of the value
of the firm before the disbursement, V0i, then the firm will utilize dividends if

I i* = R Di − RRi − ci > 0

(2)

where Ii* is the net gain from paying dividends rather than repurchasing stock, RDi is the
return from making a dividend payment, RRi is the return from making a stock repurchase,
and ci is the difference in cost of making a dividend payment relative to a stock
repurchase expressed as a fraction of the value of the firm.
Ii*, the decision variable, is a latent unobservable variable. The firm will make a
dividend payment where the net gain, Ii*, is greater than zero and utilize a stock repurchase
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where it is less than zero. Although the decision variable is not observed, we do however
observe the firm’s choice, and this is modeled by the binary selection index (dummy
variable) defined as:
I i = 1 if I i* ≥ 0
I i = 0 if I i* < 0

(for dividends)
(for stock repurchases)

Similarly, for each firm making a cash distribution, the cumulative abnormal return
around the announcement of the disbursement choice is observed ex-post. We can thus
specify the excess returns equations for firms making dividend payments and stock
repurchases as follows:
*
CAR Di = X Di β D + µ Di iff I i ≥ 0
*
CAR Ri = X Ri β R + µ Ri iff I i < 0

(3)
(4)

Equation (3) represents the cumulative abnormal return to be expected by a firm on
announcement of a dividend disbursement while equation (4) represents a similar effect for
the firm choosing a stock repurchase. The Xi terms represent the exogenous factors expected
to influence the wealth effect associated with the disbursement. These are outlined and
discussed in a later section. βD and βR are vectors of coefficients that may differ depending on
which disbursement choice is used, while µDi and µRi are the error terms in the respective
regression equations. We can substitute equations (3) and (4) into equation (2) to yield a
reduced form selection index, namely:
I i = X i (β D − β R ) + (µ Di − µ Ri )
or
I i = Z iγ − µ i
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(5)

The coefficients in equation (5) are not directly observable, however, due to the selfselectivity bias resulting from the disbursement choice being endogenously determined. That
is, the selection bias arises because the choice of a disbursement method and the abnormal
returns on announcement of the decision are jointly determined by a common set of
unobservable factors. The result is that the error terms in equation (3) and (4) will be
correlated with the error term in equation (5) and will have non-zero expectations. According
to Shehata (1991):
“Recent developments in econometrics suggest that, in the presence of self-selection
bias, using OLS in the usual fashion to estimate regression models could result in
inefficient and inconsistent estimates”.
Given the observations Ii, I use the probit maximum likelihood to estimate the
parameter γ. However, γ is estimable only up to a scale factor and I thus set Var (µi)=1
[Maddala (1991) indicates that the assumption of Var(ui)=1 is because Ii* is observed
only as a dichotomous indicator]. Finally, I assume that µDi, µRi, and µI have a trivariate
normal distribution with mean vector zero and covariance matrix:
⎛σ 2
D
⎜
∑ = ⎜σ DR
⎜
⎝σ DU

σ DR σ DU ⎞⎟
σ 2R σ RU ⎟
σ RU 1 ⎟⎠

(6)

Since σDR is not estimable by maximum likelihood (by design I treat repurchases and
dividends as separate observations and never group these for the same firm), I can set it
equal to zero and transform the Σ matrix in (6) to obtain:
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⎛ σ 2D 0 σ DU ⎞
⎟
⎜
2
∑ = ⎜ 0 σ R σ RU ⎟
⎟⎟
⎜⎜
1
σ
DU σ RU
⎠
⎝

(6a)

The likelihood function for the model is then given by:
L(β D , β R , σ D2 , σ R2 , σ Dµ , σ Rµ )
Z iγ
⎤
⎡∞
= ∏ ⎡⎢ ∫ g (CAR Di − X Di β D , µ i )dµ i ⎤⎥ ⎢ ∫ f (CAR Ri − X Ri β R , µ i )dµ i ⎥
⎣ −∞
⎦ ⎣ Z iγ
⎦
Ii

(1− I i )

(7)

where g(.) and f(.) are the bivariate normal density functions of (µDi, µi) and (µRi, µi)
respectively. Although maximization of the likelihood function in equation (7) is possible, it
can be quite cumbersome. Lee (1978) outlined a simpler two-stage “structural probit”
estimation method that involves first estimating γ from the reduced form binary choice
equation (5) by probit maximum likelihood (ML) and then using this estimate to transform
and solve equations (3) and (4) by ordinary least squares (OLS). The predicted benefit
∧

∧

differential, ( CARDi − CARRi ), is then introduced in the disbursement choice equation (5) to
obtain the “structural form” probit equation that allows for consistent estimation, again by
applying maximum likelihood procedures. The detailed “two-stage structural probit
estimation procedure” is as follows:
First, obtain the expected values of µDi and µRi conditional on the firm’s choice of
being in the sample (another way to think of this is that we are considering the expectation of
the abnormal returns conditional on the distribution being observed, whether a dividend or a
repurchase), which is defined as14:
E (µ Di γ ′Z i ≥ µ i ) = σ Dµ
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φ (γ ′Z i )
Φ(γ ′Z i )

(8)

and
E (µ Ri γ ′Z i < µ i ) = σ Rµ

− φ (γ ′Z i )
(1 − Φ(γ ′Z i ))

(9)

In equations (8) and (9) the first term on the right-hand side of the equations
measures the relationship (covariance) between the manager’s decision (choice of
disbursement method) and the outcome of the decision (resulting abnormal return), which
indicates whether managers are acting on shareholders’ behalf. It essentially is the linear
regression coefficient that results from regressing the error terms in the decision model
(equation (5)) against the error terms in the abnormal returns models (equations (3) and (4)).
The second term, referred to as the Inverse of the Mills’ Ratio (or the non-selection
hazard), is an expectation of the value of the error term in the decision model conditional on
the firm using either a dividend or a stock repurchase respectively (since the conditional
distributions of these error terms are normal). The Inverse of the Mills’ Ratio is the ratio of
the probability to the cumulative density functions evaluated at the point at which the
distribution is “separated”. As the probability of being in the selection sample (in this case,
distributing through dividends) increases, the cumulative density function approaches one
and the probability density function approaches zero, so the Inverse of the Mills’ Ratio
approaches zero. Hence, a positive (negative) coefficient on this variable in the dividend
(repurchase) abnormal returns equation indicates that sample selection is important and that
indeed managers are making decisions with regard to the welfare of the firm’s stockholders.
This result implies that the error terms in the abnormal return regression equations
will have non-zero expectations (and, hence, the self-selectivity bias).
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Given these two expectations, define WDi =

− φ (γ ′Z i )
φ (γ ′Z i )
and WRi =
, and
(1 − Φ(γ ′Z i ))
Φ (γ ′Z i )

then I can rewrite equations (3) and (4) as:

CARDi = β D′ X Di + σ Dµ WDi + ε Di

for I i = 1

(3a)

CARRi = β R′ X Ri + σ Rµ WRi + ε Ri

for I i = 0

(4a)

where the new error terms, ε Di and ε Ri have zero conditional means.
Equations (3a) and (4a) provide an insight into the self-selectivity issue. Instead of
linear equations we have two non-linear equations after the non-zero means have been
adjusted. Equation (3a) shows that the expected CAR for a firm that announces a dividend
consists of two separate components. The first term, β D′ X Di , is the expected stock market
effect for a random firm that elects to announce a dividend payment. The second term,

σ DµWDi , is the adjustment for self-selectivity that may be inherent in the sample. The
covariance term, σ Dµ , is of particular importance. It indicates that a randomly selected firm,
were it to choose to pay a dividend, would not experience a similar stock price effect to that
experienced by firms that actually paid dividends. Similar reasoning would apply to the
terms in equation (4a).
Using our estimate of γ from the probit maximum likelihood estimation of equation
(5) we obtain estimates for WDi and WRi in equations (3a) and (4a) respectively. We then
proceed to solve these equations by OLS regression, which will provide consistent estimates
for βD, βR, σDµ, and σRµ. A test for the presence of self-selectivity bias is then performed by
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examining the statistical significance of the coefficient on the Wi terms in the revised
abnormal returns equations (3a) and (4a).
Two potential problems arise with this estimation procedure, however. First, the
residuals ε Di and ε Ri in equations (3a) and (4a) are heteroscedastic. The second potential
problem with the “two-stage structurtal probit” approach was identified by Lee, Maddala,
and Trost (1980) who show that the true variances in equations (3a) and (4a) will be
underestimated since the selectivity variables are themselves estimates, that is, they are
“generated regressors”. However, the computer package used in estimating these equations
in the present research, LIMDEP, provides a full information maximum likelihood estimator
(FIML) that jointly estimates all the parameters in the model and corrects for these
difficulties. This methodological approach is thus utilized in the present study instead of the
two-stage structural probit approach outlined above.
Having estimated the two abnormal return regression equations, Maddala (1991)
suggests that our next step is to examine whether there are, in fact, any significant changes in
the estimates of the effect of the explanatory variables. This is done by comparing the
coefficients on the variables in the regression equations estimated with and without
correction for the self-selectivity bias. This will indicate whether ignoring the “non-random”
selection process has indeed produced misleading results.
I next proceed to estimate what the “predicted” abnormal return would have been
had the firm used the alternate disbursement choice, by applying the relevant variables into
the estimated CAR models. This, in effect, is the main purpose of the analysis. In this
procedure the selectivity terms are not needed and, hence, are omitted. The purpose of
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estimating the selectivity equations (3a) and (4a) was to obtain estimates of βD and βR that
are free of the selectivity bias and hence any further analyses uses these parameter estimates.
If managers are making their disbursement decisions in the best interests of the firm’s
stockholders then I would expect that the difference between the excess returns resulting
from the firm’s disbursement choice and the predicted excess returns from choosing the
alternate payout method would be positive and statistically significant. This is tested by
examining the difference between the mean abnormal returns for firms that made a particular
disbursement choice and the mean predicted abnormal return for those firms had they chosen
the alternate method.
The final step in the two-stage procedure is to estimate a benefit differential
(BENEFIT), calculated as the difference between the predicted abnormal returns for all firms
if they choose to use dividend payments and the predicted abnormal returns had they instead
chosen a stock repurchase (that is, CAˆ RDi − CAˆ RRi ). This additional explanatory variable is
then included in the disbursement choice equation (5), producing a “structural form selection
index”, which is re-estimated by the probit maximum likelihood method. A statistically
significant coefficient on the benefit differential variable indicates that managers make their
choice of a disbursement method on the basis of the differential in the expected abnormal
returns (net-benefit).
To estimate equations (3a) and (4a) I need to provide unbiased estimates of the
unconditional CAR experienced by firms around the announcement of the relevant
disbursements. This is done using standard event-study procedures employing estimated
market-model parameters. For this purpose I use returns for each firm (from the CRSP data
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base) over 190 trading days (approximately nine calendar months) from day -210 to day -21,
relative to the announcement day, to estimate a market model of the form:

Rit = αi + βiRmt + εit

(10)

Rit is the return on firm i’s stock on day t, Rmt is the return on the CRSP valueweighted index15 on day t, εit is the error term in the model (assumed to be normally
distributed with a common mean but unequal or nonhomogenous variance -- that is,
heteroscedastic), and αi and βi are the parameters that will be estimated in the OLS
regression. The estimation period is chosen so as to be close enough to the event period to
approximate the true beta during the announcement interval while being far enough to be
uncontaminated by the event. Using the returns generated from the estimated model, the
abnormal return for firm i’s stock on day t (ARit) is calculated as the deviation of the
predicted (estimated) return for day t from the actual return on day t. That is:

(

ARit = ε it = Rit − αˆ i + βˆ i Rmt

)

(11)

The abnormal returns for each firm are then summed for days -1 to +1 to arrive at the
three day cumulative abnormal return around the announcement:
+1

CA R i = ∑ A R it
t =−1

(12)

I include in the announcement interval day -1 because a leakage of information may
cause a substantial price reaction on this day while day +1 is included to account for
announcements that are made after the stock market has closed for trading. The CARi values
are then used in the OLS (or WLS) estimations of equations (3a) and (4a). The significance
of the coefficients on βD and βR, as well as the coefficients on the self-selectivity variable, can
then be examined by using standard t-test statistics.
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3.2.1

Tests for Unconditional Wealth Effects

I am primarily interested in examining the disbursement choices of managers and its
impact on stockholders’ wealth as measured by the abnormal returns observed around the
disbursement announcement. However, Ross (1989) shows that increases in the rate of
flow of idiosyncratic information manifest themselves in increases in stock price
volatility. In light of this, changes in the variance of the stock returns distribution may be
mistakenly identified as wealth effects. Sanders and Robins (1991) (SR) show that
potential bias may exist in the size of the abnormal return (and, hence, the reported “wealth”
effect) when an event induces a change in the residual variance of the abnormal returns
distribution (σ i2 ) and the mean-effects test procedures applied to detect wealth effects do not
incorporate such variance changes (for example, the z-test frequently used in event studies
would here have a magnifying effect with a tendency to reject a correct null too often).
Under these circumstances, the researcher is likely to misclassify as a wealth effect the
information effect represented by the change in variance.
Whereas both wealth and variance effects relate to the release of “new” information
to the market, a practical distinction between the two may be considered by looking at the
level of uncertainty contained in the information released. That is, where the new
information is known to contain either “good” or “bad” news about the firm, then the market
will incorporate this as a wealth effect. However, when there is uncertainty as to the nature
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of the new information (whether it is “good” or “bad” news), then this will be incorporated
by the market as a variance effect.
To avoid potential bias in misrepresenting the wealth effect resulting from the
managers’ disbursement choices, I test the following hypothesis prior to the self-selectivity
modeling:
Hypothesis: Did the disbursement event unconditionally change the mean of the
abnormal returns distribution?

To provide an unconditional test of the mean CAR around the event announcement,
Robins and Sanders (1993) (RS) suggested a multiple-day event period analog to the tstatistic developed by Collins and Dent (1984)(CD) to test single-day average abnormal

returns measures. The CD statistic is shown to be asymptotically the best linear unbiased
estimator of the average abnormal return and incorporates in its formulation any serial
correlation between the market returns over the estimation period. The RS analog is
calculated as follows:
t CA R =

A CA R

∑

I
i =1

[(CA R − A CA R )
i

( I − 1) ∑

I
i =1

(1

σ

σ

2

2
CA R i

)

2
CA R i

(13)

]

ACAR, the average cumulative abnormal return, is calculated using the formula:
2
∑Ii =1 (CA R i σ CA
R )
A CA R =
I
2
∑i =1 (1 σ CA R )
i

(14)

i
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⎢⎣
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(

⎤
⎥
⎥
⎥⎦

(15)

where:

σ i2
K

Ti
rmt
rmτ
rm

≡ residual variance from estimation of the market model for firm i
≡ 3; the number of days accumulated in the calculation of CARi
≡ number of returns used to estimate the market model for firm i
≡ return to the market portfolio on event-day t
≡ return to the market portfolio on estimation day τ
≡ mean return to the market portfolio over the estimation period

This procedure, in effect, employs an estimated generalized least squares
methodology to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARi). Under the null hypothesis
that the average cumulative abnormal returns equals zero, tCAR follows a Student-t distribution
with I-1 degrees of freedom. For comparative purposes, I also calculate the simple average
cumulative abnormal return (AVGCAR) and a Z-test based upon the average standardized
cumulative abnormal return (ASCAR), as these are frequently reported in the event study
literature. These are:
I

∑ CARi

AVG CAR =

i =1

(16)

I

and

Z CAR =

⎛ I
⎜∑
i =1
I⎜
⎜
⎝

[ CAR

⎞

i

σ CAR ] ⎟
i

I

⎟=
⎟
⎠

I ( ASCAR )

(17)

Although the Z-test adjusts for and incorporates any serial correlation in the
prediction errors (abnormal returns), it nevertheless ignores any event induced changes in the
residual variance of the abnormal returns distribution.
Further, Denis and Kadlec (1994) observed that non-synchronous trading -- the
tendency for prices recorded at the end of a day to represent the outcome of a transaction
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occurring earlier in that day -- causes serial cross-correlations in security returns, leading to
biased estimates of systematic risk when using simple ordinary least squares regression to
estimate the market model. In addition, they find significant decreases in trading activity
following share repurchases. Given that I have required firms in my sample to have no
missing returns during the announcement period and no more than 15 days missing returns
during the estimation periods, this is not expected to be a cause for concern in this study16.

3.3

Sample Selection and Description

Due to the nature of the specific research to be undertaken, the data sample that I use
in this study is taken from various sources. The sample covers the period 1984 - 1995 and
consists of the following sub-samples:

1.

The sample of firms with dividend increases are selected by randomly

searching the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Returns Master File for
firms with increases in consecutive regular quarterly dividends per share over the period
covered by the study. In addition, no other type of distribution must be made by the firm
during the period between the two quarterly dividends. This comprises all firms listed on
either the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (AMEX), or
the North American Securities Dealers Automated Quotation (NASDAQ) System.
The market reaction theories presented earlier predict a price reaction only to
announcements of unexpected dividend increases. In an attempt to capture this, I require that
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the increase must be at least 10 percent in order for the announcement to be included in the
sample. This lower bound of 10 percent ensures that only economically significant
dividend changes are included in the sample17. In addition, to minimize the effect of
outliers, I impose an upper bound of 700 percent on the size of the dividend increase. To
quantify the dividend changes I apply the naïve expectations model, which states:
^

Di ,t = Di ,t −1
That is, the best estimate at time (t-1) of dividends in time (t) is the dividends paid at time (t1). Using this model, unexpected dividends are thus represented by the actual amount of the

dividend increase.
The use of the naïve model is supported by the empirical observation that firms
generally do not change their dollar dividends frequently and hence follow a fairly stable,
predictable dividend payment policy. Damodaran (2001), using data from Compustat,
reports that between 1989 and 1998, in most years the number of firms that do not change
their dollar dividends far exceeds the number that do18.
Lintner (1956) in his classic study on how managers make dividend decisions, found
that they stabilize dividends with gradual, sustainable increases whenever possible, establish
an appropriate target payout ratio, and avoid dividend cuts, if at all possible. Fama and
Babiak (1968) reevaluated Lintner’s model and concluded that it continues to perform well
relative to alternative specifications using both economywide earnings and dividend data as
well as data for individual firms.
In addition to this (that is, to identify and quantify unexpected dividend signals) the
dividend increase must be the first in any series of consecutive regular quarterly increases of
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similar magnitude. That is, in a series of consecutive quarterly increases, I exclude from the
sample all subsequent increases unless they represent a percentage change larger than that
observed in the previous quarter.

2.

The initial sample of specially designated dividends is taken from the CRSP

daily master files. To be included in my initial sample (through searching on distributions
coded as “year-end”, “extra”, or “special”) the distribution must be the first specially
designated dividend declared by the firm in at least a 2-year period. This is to avoid pulling
those distributions labeled as specially designated dividends but that are in reality annual
dividends. I also use a similar procedure to search for special dividend announcements on
the Wall Street Journal Index (WSJI) of the LEXIS/NEXIS reference database.

3.

I identify the initial sample of open market repurchase programs and

repurchase tender offer announcements from the following sources:

•

The appendix to Comment and Jarrell (1991) covering announcements from
1984 to 1989.

•

A general search of the repurchases database of the Securities Data Company
(SDC).

•

A general search of the WSJI of the LEXIS/NEXIS reference database.

•

A general search of the CRSP master file.
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This sample is reduced by exclusion of repurchase offers available only to odd-lot
holders, those offers by closed-end investment companies, and offers whose intention was to
take the firm private.
The initial samples are reduced by applying the following screens to the data:
1. Since the model implies a mutually exclusive choice between dividends and
repurchases, I exclude from the sample firms that concurrently announce both a
dividend and a stock repurchase.19
2. Firms must have returns data available on CRSP for at least 250 trading days
(one calendar year) before and 150 trading days (seven calendar months) after
the date of the disbursement announcement. In addition, there can be no more
than 15 days missing returns during the estimation period from 210 to 21 days
prior to the event date, and no missing returns over the 3-day event period.
3. Firms must have the relevant accounting data available on the COMPUSTAT
database for calculation of the various measures used in the decision models
(these are detailed in a later section).
4. I eliminate from the sample financial firms (SIC codes 6000 - 6999), utilities
(SIC codes 4900 - 4949), and regulated telephone companies (SIC code 4813)20.
Event dates for the various announcements are taken from the relevant sources (that
is, CRSP, WSJI, SDC database, or Comment & Jarrell’s Appendix). The final sample
consists of 2,423 dividend increases, 1,931 open market repurchases, 313 special dividends,
and 222 repurchase tender offer announcements. Table 1 shows the distribution of
announcements across the sample period, broken down with respect to disbursement type
and year.
It appears that the observations are fairly evenly spread across the sample period.
The notable exception to this is the number of open market repurchase announcements in
1987 and 1989/90. This can be accounted for by the documented increase in repurchase
authorizations around the period of the stock market crashes in 1987 and 1990, supposedly
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in response to the belief that stocks were highly undervalued at these times. Overall, the
sample of disbursement announcements does not display any major problems of clustering in
any single year.

Table 1. Distribution of Sample Announcements by Type and Year
Announcement Type
Year

Dividend
Increases

Open Market
Repurchases

1984

203

117

54

22

396

1985

217

55

12

18

302

1986

168

62

15

15

260

1987

230

254

16

10

510

1988

268

61

45

15

389

1989

268

167

36

29

500

1990

222

307

43

19

591

1991

147

110

25

23

305

1992

157

171

17

16

361

1993

168

155

21

20

364

1994

188

240

16

17

461

1995

187

232

13

18

450

TOTAL

2423

1931

313

222

4889

3.4

Special
Dividends

Repurchase
Tender Offers TOTAL

Identification of Explanatory Variables

Considering the theories developed and discussed in chapters 1 and 2, a number of
factors emerge as potential discriminators of disbursement type. Much support for dividends
as a signaling device has been provided by many of the researchers cited previously. As
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discussed above, the characteristics of the signal for stock repurchases appear to be distinct
from that for regular dividends. Based on the overwhelming support for information
signaling by financial researchers, proxies for signaling should be useful in empirically
differentiating between managers' choices of the form of their cash distributions.
I use two proxies to “measure” managers’ signaling of private information and the
level of information asymmetry. These are (i) the change in annual earnings per share
between the year prior to and the year subsequent to the disbursement, scaled by the firm’s
stock price 5 days before the announcement date (DEPS), and (ii) the residual volatility in
daily stock returns in the year preceding the event announcement, (RVOL), measured as the
standard deviation in the market-adjusted daily stock returns.
DEPS is used to proxy for signaling since the theory posits that improved operating
performance is included in the “content” of the signal. Dierkins(1991) and Krishnaswami
and Subramaniam (1999) suggest that information asymmetry (high when managers have a
relatively large amount of value-relevant, firm-specific information that is not shared by the
market) can be captured by the market-adjusted standard deviation of the daily stock price
abnormal returns (Rit – Rmt). Hence I use RVOL as a proxy for the level of information
asymmetry. Ofer and Thakor (1987) suggest that greater information asymmetry should be
characteristic of the stock repurchasing firms relative to firms that use dividend payments.
Hence, I expect comparatively larger values for these variables to be associated with the use
of repurchases, while smaller values should be associated with dividends.
The signaling hypothesis also posits that repurchasing firms are undervalued and, in
this regard, I would expect the market’s valuation of firms utilizing repurchases to be lower,
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ceteris paribus, than for those distributing cash through dividends. Tobin’s Q, (TOBINQ) a
measure of the firm’s investment opportunity set, is used as a proxy for classifying firms as
either growth firms / value-maximizers (Q>1) or overinvestors (Q<1). I adopt Chung and
Pruitt’s (1994) equation 2 to proxy for Tobin’s Q:

q = (MVE + PS +DEBT) / TA
where MVE is the market value of the firm’s common stock, PS is the liquidating value of
the firm’s outstanding preferred stock, DEBT is the value of the firm’s short-term liabilities
net of its short-term assets, plus the book value of the firm’s long-term debt, and TA is the
book value of the total assets of the firm. They show that this approximation to Q explains at
least 96.6 percent of the variability in the more theoretically correct model of Tobin’s Q.
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) find that firms with Q<1 have, on average, greater
stock price reactions to dividend changes than do firms with Q>1. Denis, Denis, and Sarin
(1994) also find evidence that Tobin’s Q and dividend yield are negatively correlated. Since
Q is used as a measure of growth opportunities I expect that higher ratios should be
associated with higher-valued firms and lower ratios associated with lower valued firms.
Because the signaling/undervaluation hypothesis suggests that repurchases are used mainly
by firms that are undervalued, I expect firms choosing dividends to be those with higher
ratios for Tobin’s Q.
Closely linked to this is the use of a proxy measure for the level of free cash flow
existing within the firm at the time of the disbursement decision, (FCF). As previously used
by Maquiera and Megginson (1994), this is calculated as the after-tax undistributed cash
flow of the company (cash flow from operations net of debt payments, preferred dividends
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and common dividends) divided by the market value of its equity. Free cash flow theory
posits that corporate disbursements are used to reduce free cash flows and thereby lower the
associated mitigating agency costs. Taking this into consideration, as well as the empirical
observation that the monies distributed by companies during stock repurchases usually
represent a larger fraction of their outstanding equity as compared with dividends,21 I can
expect higher levels of free cash flow to be associated with greater utilization of stock
repurchases. However, as discussed earlier, only a small percentage of repurchases should be
undertaken for the specific purpose of reducing agency costs -- since empirical observations
suggest that repurchases usually involve external financing. In this regard, it is not certain,

ex-ante, how well the level of free cash flow will perform as a discriminatory variable.
A potentially useful factor in the model, as suggested by Bagnoli, Gordon, and
Lipman (1989) and Bagwell (1991), is a measure for corporate control, specifically defense
against hostile takeovers (TKOVER). This is introduced as a dummy variable representing
the presence of such activities facing the firm within one year preceding the disbursement
announcement22. In the present framework only stock repurchases has been suggested as a
possible mechanism for such control. I would thus expect a variable measuring the presence
of takeover activity (and possibly the existence of agency problems) to be related to the form
of disbursement used by the firm.
One testable prediction of the capital structure hypothesis discussed in chapter 2
(Section 2.2.2) is that repurchasing firms should have less leverage than non-repurchasing
firms. In the decision model, I use the firm’s debt/equity ratio (LTDEQ) -- measured as long-
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term debt divided by the book value of equity -- as a measure of the firm’s financial
leverage.
Fenn and Liang (2000), in studying the relationship between open market
repurchases and dividend payment, find that repurchases are positively related to proxies for
free cash flow and negatively related to proxies for marginal financing costs. Firm size has
been empirically related to both market return and disbursement characteristics, and is a
plausible proxy (inverse) for marginal financing costs. Hence, I include a factor for size,
(SIZE), calculated as the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to
the announcement date. However, since Fama and French (2000) conclude that smaller firms
are less likely to pay dividends, the ex-ante relationship of firm size to disbursement choice
is not certain. Fenn and Liang (2000) also conclude that the presence and level of
management stock options induces a preference for open market repurchases compared to
dividend payments. Given this, I include a proxy for management stock options (MNSTK) in
the disbursement decision equation. The proxy I use is adopted from their paper and is
calculated as the number of common shares reserved for conversion for stock options,
convertible securities, and warrants, divided by the total number of shares the firm has
outstanding. Given their finding that managerial stock incentives might serve to mitigate
agency costs I would expect a positive relationship between managerial stock options and
the abnormal returns around disbursement announcements.
Dividend yield is also expected to be an important variable in the firm’s choice
between dividends and repurchases. This can be considered as a proxy for a firm’s “taxclientele”. The variable DIVYLD represents the average dividend yield of the firm for the
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three years leading up to the disbursement announcement. Based on the clientele argument,
firms with high dividend yields prior to the disbursement will be more likely to continue
using dividends as a means to distribute cash to shareholders. Additionally, if stock
repurchases and dividends are partial signaling substitutes, then I would expect the stock
market’s price reaction to a repurchase announcement to be negatively related to the firm’s
prior dividend yield.
The financial flexibility hypotheses of Guay and Harford (2000) and Jagannathan,
Stephens, and Weisbach (2000) indicate that measures of earnings volatility, cash flow
permanence, and prior stock performance are important in discriminating between dividends
and repurchases. In similar fashion, I use EARVOL – the standard deviation in the ratio of
operating income to total assets of the firm over the five years leading up to the
announcement – to measure earnings volatility and AVGRET – the average daily stock
return in the year preceding the announcement – to estimate prior stock performance. I apply
two variants of their measures of cash flow permanence: RELPERM measures the relative
proportion of permanent cash flows and is calculated as the average of the ratio of operating
to total income (operating plus non-operating income) over the three years prior to the
announcement and CFPERM measures the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from
operations to total assets in the three years before and after the announcement.
Finally, in line with the conclusions of Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (1999)
that the abnormal returns around dividend announcements are related to the decline in
systematic risk, I include DBETA in the abnormal returns equations to proxy for the change
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in systematic risk (measured as the difference in the CRSP market-model beta of the firm,
estimated for 150 trading days before and after the announcement).
Descriptive statistics for each of the factors mentioned above are provided in Table 2
for the 4,889 firms in the final sample (separated according to the disbursement method
used). SIZE, AVGRET, CFPERM, and DBETA appear to be approximately normally
distributed. However, all the other variables display definitely skewed distributions, with the
means generally being larger than the corresponding median (except for FCF and
RELPERM that have medians higher than their means). The average size of firms in the
sample was 19.76 (equivalent to $382 million), while the mean (median) dividend yield was
2.29 percent (1.81 percent). Only 1.4 percent of firms in the sample faced hostile takeover
activity within a year preceding the disbursement announcement.
From a preliminary analysis of the differences in the means of the variables between
dividend increasing and open market repurchasing firms, as provided in Table 3, it appears
that RVOL, TOBINQ, FCF, SIZE, MNSTK, DIVYLD, EARVOL, AVGRET, RELPERM
and DBETA are the variables of primary interest in discriminating between the disbursement
types. The mean RVOL for the dividend sample was 1.93 percent while that for the
repurchase sample was 2.45 percent. TOBINQ and FCF averaged 1.325 (1.078) and 0.045
(0.012) respectively for dividend increasing (open market repurchasing) firms. Stock
repurchasing firms also appear to be smaller, with an average equity market value of $304
million (SIZE = 19.53), compared to $553 million (SIZE = 20.13) for dividend paying firms.
For the firms using dividends, MNSTK averaged 10.99 percent of shares outstanding while
stock repurchasing firms had an average of 17.79 percent. Dividend paying firms had an
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average DIVYLD of 2.28 percent compared to 1.62 percent for repurchasing firms. Dividend
increasing firms also had an average of 0.0319, 0.00095, 0.9316, and 0.00016 for EARVOL,
AVGRET, RELPERM, and DBETA respectively, while the averages for repurchasing firms
were 0.0438, 0.00033, 0.8888, and -0.0461 respectively.

Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Decision Variables in Final Sample
Variables measured are: DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price;
RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a
dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise);
LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of
the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the
total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to
the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the
announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement.

Variable
DEPS
RVOL
TOBINQ
FCF
TKOVER
1
LTDEQ
SIZE
MNSTK
DIVYLD
EARVOL
AVGRET
RELPERM
CFPERM
DBETA
1

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Minimum

0.00901
0.02209
1.17792
0.01489
0.01374
54.90368
19.75509
0.14291
2.28767
0.03921
0.00069
0.91318
-0.00750
-0.01750

0.00431
0.01911
0.90518
0.05680
0
24.75900
19.69585
0.08114
1.81400
0.02890
0.00067
0.94427
-0.00635
-0.02345

0.57053
0.01176
1.02008
0.38726
0.11642
407.41702
1.96581
0.31562
5.30069
0.05124
0.00135
0.46380
0.06146
0.51662

-26.33846
0.00689
-0.58456
-14.9913
0
1
-2217.60
14.26429
0
0
0.00162
-0.00552
-21.21218
-0.42028
-5.19600

Maximum
22.45415
0.14784
12.92904
2.34022
1
15986.59
25.15223
16.53088
150.71067
2.61573
0.01181
13.96224
0.73210
3.18831

Note: Because I use book value of equity, firms can have negative debt/equity ratios due to the effect
of accumulated losses (resulting in negative stockholder’s equity).
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Table 3. Sample Characteristics: Dividend Increases versus Open Market Repurchases
Variables measured are: DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price;
RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a
dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise);
LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of
the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the
total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to
the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the
announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement.

DIVIDEND INCREASES

Variable

OPEN-MARKET REPURCHASES

Mean

Median

Mean

Median

DEPS

0.00625

0.00447

-0.01430

0.00386

RVOL*

0.01925

0.01760

0.02450

0.02134

TOBINQ*

1.32534

1.03579

1.07752

0.82884

FCF*

0.04508

0.05680

0.01205

0.05816

TKOVER

0.01007

0

0.00950

0

LTDEQ

51.46277

25.36400

42.54777

22.89700

SIZE*

20.13075

20.10306

19.53346

19.41784

MNSTK*

0.10986

0.06668

0.17794

0.10742

DIVYLD*

2.28276

2.01350

1.62104

1.17600

EARVOL*

0.03194

0.02490

0.04377

0.03222

AVGRET*

0.00095

0.00086

0.00033

0.00033

RELPERM*

0.93160

0.95098

0.88879

0.93950

CFPERM

-0.00848

-0.00728

-0.00671

-0.00542

DBETA*

0.00016

-0.01322

-0.04610

-0.04002

* A t-test for difference among the means was significant for these variables at the 10% level.

The means of the variables for special dividend and repurchase tender offer firms are
provided in Table 4. Here it appears that DEPS, RVOL, TOBINQ, TKOVER, SIZE,
MNSTK, and DIVYLD are the primary discriminatory variables.

60

Table 4. Sample Characteristics: Special Dividends versus Repurchase Tender Offers
Variables measured are: DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price;
RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as
defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a
dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise);
LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of
the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the
total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to
the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the
announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement.

SPECIAL DIVIDENDS

Variable

Mean

DEPS*
-0.00163
RVOL*
0.02516
TOBINQ*
0.93233
FCF
-0.10372
TKOVER*
0.03165
LTDEQ 117.40620
SIZE*
18.65012
MNSTK*
0.11252
DIVYLD*
6.59464
EARVOL
0.05139
AVGRET
0.00093
RELPERM
0.91767
CFPERM
-0.00927
DBETA
-0.00643

REPURCHASE TENDER OFFERS

Median

Mean

0.00386
0.02189
0.68135
0.04284
0
19.53300
18.55814
0.06107
2.77967
0.04012
0.00076
0.92530
-0.00821
0.00680

0.26398
0.02771
0.78597
-0.12766
0.06726
115.50317
19.12846
0.23950
2.22082
0.06205
0.00081
0.92073
-0.00115
0.02681

Median
0.00753
0.02098
0.64562
0.04255
0
48.35600
18.91800
0.13031
1.55733
0.03856
0.00072
0.93579
-0.00312
-0.03629

* A t-test for difference among the means was significant for these variables at the 10% level.

DEPS averaged -0.0016 for firms paying special dividends and 0.264 for firms
utilizing repurchase tender offers. The mean RVOL for the dividend sample was 2.52
percent while that for the repurchase sample was 2.77 percent. TOBINQ averaged 0.932 and
0.786 respectively for dividend paying and repurchasing firms. Only 3.17 percent of
dividend paying firms faced hostile takeover activity within a year of the dividend
announcement, compared to 6.73 percent of the firms using stock repurchases. Stock
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repurchasing firms are also larger, with an average equity market value of $203 million
(SIZE = 19.13), compared to $126 million (SIZE = 18.65) for dividend paying firms. For the
firms using dividends, MNSTK averaged 11.25 percent of shares outstanding while stock
repurchasing firms had an average of 23.95 percent. Dividend paying firms had an average
DIVYLD of 6.59 percent compared to 2.22 percent for repurchasing firms.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter I have sought to provide an outline of the hypotheses that were
examined, the sources of the data, and the techniques and procedures that I used in
addressing the issues presented in this study.
I have sought to address the self-selectivity problem inherent in studies of this nature
by simultaneously modeling the manager’s decision process and the stock market’s reaction
to the announcement of the firm’s chosen disbursement type through a full information
maximum likelihood modeling technique. The expectation is that the firm’s disbursement
choice will be positively related to the associated stock price implications of the choice, with
managers acting to maximize their stockholders’ wealth.
Based on the foregoing discussions, I have summarized in Table 5 the variables
that are used in the analyses and their expected signs in the relevant equations, as well as
the rationale behind their inclusion. These are analyzed and the findings discussed in the
following chapter and form the foundation of the concluding section.

62

Table 5. Proxy Variables Used in Statistical Analyses

Proxy
Variable

Hypothesized Sign
Choice
Benefits Regression
Equation
Dividend
Repurchase

Rationale

DEPS

-ve

+ve

+ve

Signaling

RVOL

-ve

+ve

+ve

Asymmetric information

TOBINQ

+ve

-ve

-ve

Undervaluation

-ve / +ve

+ve

+ve

Agency, free cash flow

TKOVER

-ve

neutral

-ve

Corporate control

LTDEQ

+ve

-ve

-ve

Capital structure
hypothesis

-ve / +ve

-ve

-ve

Financing cost

MNSTK

-ve

-ve

-ve

Managerial incentives

DIVYLD

+ve

+ve

-ve

Clientele

EARVOL

-ve

-ve

-ve

Financial flexibility

AVGRET

+ve

+ve

+ve

Financial flexibility

RELPERM

+ve

+ve

+ve

Cash flow permanence

CFPERM

+ve

+ve

+ve

Cash flow permanence

DBETA23

--

+ve

neutral

BENEFIT

+ve

--

--

FCF

SIZE
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Risk signaling
Wealth maximization

Chapter 4
Results and Interpretation

Due to the large number of variables involved in the regression models considered in
this research, the possibility exists that strong or severe multicollinearity could be present in
the sample.24 As a measure of the degree of multicollinearity in the sample, I examine the
pairwise correlations among the quantitative variables. From Table 6 it can be seen that a
number of pairs of factors have correlation coefficients larger than 0.10. The largest of these
are 0.579 between RVOL and SIZE and 0.376 between TOBINQ and SIZE. The other
coefficients above 0.10 are between DEPS and CFPERM, RVOL and EARVOL, RVOL and
AVGRET, TOBINQ and AVGRET, TOBINQ and CFPERM, and FCF and DIVYLD. From
this cursory examination, it would not appear that multicollinearity is a major problem in the
present sample.

4.1

Unconditional Wealth Effects

The question I sought to answer was whether the disbursement events
unconditionally changed the mean of the abnormal returns distributions, resulting in a
statistically significant wealth effect (as measured by the three day cumulative abnormal
return).
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Table 6. Correlation Matrix of Factors in the Decision Model
Factors:

DEPS

RVOL

TOBINQ

FCF

LTDEQ

SIZE

MNSTK

DIVYLD

EARVOL

AVGRET

RELPERM

CFPERM

DEPS

1.000

RVOL

0.053

1.000

TOBINQ

0.015

-0.102*

1.000

-0.029

-0.098

0.032

1.000

0.044

0.050

-0.016

-0.071

1.000

-0.021

-0.579*

0.376*

0.071

-0.009

1.000

MNSTK

0.034

0.058

-0.052

-0.045

0.036

-0.034

1.000

DIVYLD

-0.005

-0.086

-0.050

-0.263*

0.015

0.034

-0.023

1.000

EARVOL

0.025

0.272*

0.069

-0.005

0.019

-0.206*

0.040

-0.023

1.000

AVGRET

-0.028

0.135*

0.214*

0.031

0.022

0.064

-0.023

0.031

0.035

1.000

RELPERM

0.005

-0.007

0.056

0.001

-0.001

0.053

-0.012

-0.007

0.043

0.049

1.000

CFPERM

0.117*

0.036

0.115*

0.053

0.026

0.017

0.033

-0.058

0.006

0.079

-0.021

1.000

DBETA

-0.008

-0.004

0.013

-0.018

0.049

-0.018

-0.003

0.036

-0.008

0.080

0.003

0.010

FCF
LTDEQ
SIZE

DBETA

1.000

* - Pairwise correlation coefficients greater than 0.10.
DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the
announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long
Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion
as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the
ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM
measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to
total assets in the three years before and after the announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement.
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The results of the tests are presented in Table 7 and Table 8 below. For the sample of
open market repurchase announcements (provided in Panel A of Table 7), both the
conditional and unconditional mean effects test statistics, using the standard market model (z
= 19.97 and t = 11.04 respectively), are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This
suggests that open market repurchases have elicited a significant wealth effect
notwithstanding the associated information effect represented by the possible change in the
variance of the returns distribution.

Table 7. Statistical Results for Unconditional Wealth Effects - Repurchases
Results are given for the market model estimation using returns data from 210 to 21 days before the event.
Standard t and z tests are calculated based on an unconditional average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR as
per Robins and Sanders (1993)) and a simple average cumulative abnormal return (AVGCAR) for the 3-day
event window from day -1 to +1.
Panel A: Open Market Stock Repurchases
Sample Size

1931

ACAR
t-statistic

0.0127*
11.04

AVGCAR
z-statistic

0.0204*
19.97
Panel B: Repurchase Tender Offers

Sample Size

222

ACAR
t-statistic

0.0230*
6.12

AVGCAR
z-statistic

0.0271*
11.54

* - Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test
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The qualitative results for the Repurchase Tender Offer sample are similar to those
for the sample of open market repurchases. Both the conditional and unconditional mean
effects test statistics are statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In general, the observed stock market reactions for the open market repurchase
sample are in accord with the results of earlier studies, with an AVGCAR of 2.0 percent.
However, the AVGCAR for the Repurchase Tender Offer sample appears somewhat low
(2.7%) compared with an average of between 5 percent and 9 percent from previous
studies.25

Table 8. Statistical Results for Unconditional Wealth Effects - Dividend
Announcements
Results are given for the market model estimation using returns data from 210 to 21 days before the event.
Standard t and z tests are calculated based on an unconditional average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR as
per Robins and Sanders (1993)) and a simple average cumulative abnormal return (AVGCAR) for the 3-day
event window from day -1 to +1.
Panel A: Dividend Increases
Sample Size

2423

ACAR
t-statistic

0.0071*
10.16

AVGCAR
z-statistic

0.0086*
13.21
Panel B: Special Dividends

Sample Size

313

ACAR
t-statistic

0.0232*
6.28

AVGCAR
z-statistic

0.0323*
14.30

* - Statistically significant at the 1% level using a two-tailed test
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Table 8 provides results for the statistical tests of the stock market’s reaction to
dividend announcements. From Panel A, the information effect for dividend increase
announcements, represented by the change in the mean of the returns distribution, is
statistically significant and positive (AVGCAR of 0.86 percent and z-statistic = 13.21).
Similar results are displayed for the sample of Special Dividends with statistically significant
conditional and unconditional wealth effects. The reported AVGCARs are also similar to
what has been reported in earlier studies26.

4.2

Results for Self-Selectivity Models

Having established from the previous section that the disbursement events in fact
yielded statistically significant wealth effects, I can thus proceed confidently to address
the issue of self-selectivity. The selectivity models were developed using the full
information maximum likelihood approach (FIML) as outlined in chapter 3 of this study.

4.2.1

Reduced Form Probit Model

Maximum likelihood estimates of the reduced form probit choice models, that
include all predetermined explanatory variables, are presented in Table 9. For the sample
of dividend increasing and open market stock repurchasing firms, the reduced form
estimation results are as suggested from the univariate results in Table 3 and Table 4. The
probability of utilizing a dividend increase versus making an open market stock
repurchase is statistically significantly positively related to the level of undervaluation
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(TOBINQ), the free cash flows of the firm (FCF), the average dividend yield (DIVYLD),
and the one year average daily stock return prior to announcement (AVGRET).

Table 9. Reduced Form Probit Models Predicting the Choice of Disbursement
Results for the probit maximum likelihood decision models (with dependent variable I=1 for dividends and 0 for repurchases)
using the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) approach. DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the
announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the
announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and
Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the
announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the
natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved
for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the
three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over
the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement;
RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement;
CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after
the announcement; and DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement

Dividend Increases versus
Open Market Repurchases

Special Dividends versus
Repurchase Tender Offers

CONSTANT
DEPS
RVOL
TOBINQ
FCF
TKOVER
LTDEQ
SIZE
MNSTK
DIVYLD
EARVOL
AVGRET
RELPERM
CFPERM
DBETA

2.21106*
-0.00475
-40.39690*
0.11080*
0.33359*
-0.07152
0.00018
-0.07098*
-0.27700*
0.03345*
-5.43440*
270.97200*
0.04654
-0.96587*
0.05059

3.89893*
-0.41001
-19.44250*
0.30171*
0.05540
-0.45758
0.00019
-0.18201*
-0.98729*
0.05091*
-1.50950
80.58510**
0.02881
-0.57376
-0.08330

Chi-Squared
Pseudo R2
% Correctly Classified
Sample Size

773.33*
0.4937
67.73
4354

Variable

101.38*
0.6296
69.16
535

* (**) - Statistically significant at the 1% and 10% level respectively.
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The probability of utilizing a dividend increase versus making an open market
stock repurchase is statistically significantly negatively related to the residual volatility in
the firm’s daily stock returns (RVOL), the market value of the firm’s equity (SIZE), the
extent of available managerial stock options (MNSTK), the volatility of the firm’s
operating earnings (EARVOL), and the difference in the levels of permanent cash flows
of the firm pre and post announcement (CFPERM).
However, the coefficients on the change in annual earnings per share (DEPS), the
firms exposure to hostile takeovers (TKOVER), the debt to equity ratio (LTDEQ), the
relative proportion of permanent cash flows (RELPERM), and the change in systematic
risk (DBETA) are not statistically significant. The signs of the coefficients on the
explanatory variables are generally as hypothesized (see Table 5) with the only exception
being the negative sign on CFPERM. This lends support to the theoretical underpinnings
of the model specification, as developed in the earlier chapters of this study, and thus
supports the findings of earlier research in this area.
The model had a high pseudo-R2 of 49percent attesting to the overall explanatory
power of the reduced form choice equation. The model was able to correctly classify the
disbursement type approximately seventy percent of the time. The statistically significant
Chi-squared value also indicates that at least one of the discriminatory variables is able to
detect significant differences between firms that increase dividends and those that
repurchase their stock.
Results are qualitatively similar for firms choosing between a special dividend
and a repurchase tender offer. All the coefficients on the explanatory variables have the
expected sign, with the exception of CFPERM (but, the coefficient is not statistically
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significant) although the t-tests are generally not as strong. For this sub-sample DEPS,
FCF, TKOVER, LTDEQ, EARVOL, RELPERM, and DBETA are also not statistically
significant determinants of disbursement choice.

4.2.2

Abnormal Return Regression Equations

The next stage of the analysis required the fitted values from the reduced form
probit equations being used to construct the inverse Mills ratios for the dividend and
repurchase sub-samples. The abnormal return equations (equations 3a and 4a) obtained
by adding these variables to the corresponding abnormal return equations (equations 3
and 4) are now estimated consistently (using maximum likelihood (ML) for the FIML
approach. These results are presented in Table 10 for the dividend increasing and open
market repurchase sub-sample and Table 11 for the special dividend and repurchase
tender offer sub-sample.
The question of the existence of a self-selection bias is examined from these
results in two ways. First, I examine the difference in the coefficient estimates between
the selectivity model and the standard OLS model and second, I consider the statistical
significance of the coefficient on the selectivity variable (that is, the inverse Mills ratio
variable (Wi)). For the dividend increasing firms there is very little difference between
the OLS and the selectivity coefficients. With the exception of the MNSTK variable
(which is not statistically significant), the largest percentage difference between the
coefficients on the alternate models is 9.48%. Further, the signs of the coefficients are
identical between both models (again with the exception of the sign on MNSTK). At this
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preliminary stage then, it would appear that the dividend increasing firms do not selfselect, but would have created more wealth for their stockholders by offering to instead
repurchase their shares. This is further supported by the lack of a statistically significant
coefficient on the selectivity variable (Wi).
Notwithstanding the failure to detect a significant sample selection bias, the
abnormal returns equations are in accord with the findings of other researchers and our
earlier expectations. The signs of the coefficients are generally as expected (the exception
to this only applies to variables that are not statistically significant in the regression
equation, that is, TOBINQ, LTDEQ, MNSTK, and AVGRET). The variables that are
statistically significantly related to the disbursement announcement abnormal returns for
the dividend increasing firms are DEPS, SIZE, DIVYLD, CFPERM, and DBETA,
indicating that asymmetric information/signaling, clientele effects, and cash flow
permanence play a role in explaining the observed stock price reaction.
A contrasting picture emerges for the open market repurchasing firms. The
coefficient estimates are significantly different on average, and have opposite signs a
number of times, from the corresponding coefficient estimates using standard ordinary
least squares without correcting for the selection bias. In fact, the percentage differences
between the coefficients on the alternate models range from as low as 26 percent to just
over 2330 percent. Additionally, the estimated coefficient on the inverse Mills ratio
variable (Wi), which corrects for the selection bias, is negative and statistically
significant at an alpha of 1 percentage point.
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Table 10. Comparison of Selection (ML) Model and OLS Coefficient Estimates: Dividend
Increases and Open Market Repurchases
Results for the ML regressions with self-selectivity adjustment variable and OLS regressions without the selectivity
adjustment. The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR around the disbursement announcement. Variables measured are: DEPS
is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in
daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994);
FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile
takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt
to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK
is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the
average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating
income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year
preceding the announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior
to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three
years before and after the announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; and Wi is
the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills Ratio). Significance of independent variables are tested using standard t-tests.

Parameter Estimates
Dividend Increases Sample
Independent
Variables

ML
(Selection)

OLS

% ∆ in
Coeff.

Open Market Repurchases Sample
ML
(Selection)

OLS

% ∆ in
Coeff.

CONSTANT
0.04399**
0.04436*
0.83%
0.11822*
-0.00528
2339.36%
DEPS
0.02941**
0.02938*
-0.09%
0.00547**
0.00248
-120.10%
RVOL
0.52285
0.50400*
-3.74%
0.64250*
1.69300*
62.05%
TOBINQ
0.00100
0.00105
4.19%
0.00976*
0.00284
-243.05%
FCF
0.00295
0.00311
5.11%
0.00599
-0.00062
1063.58%
TKOVER
-0.00811
-0.00814
0.33%
-0.01984
-0.01574
-26.08%
1
LTDEQ
0.00000
0.00000
2.26%
0.00002
0.00001
-64.45%
SIZE
-0.00256** -0.00259*
1.17%
-0.00386*
-0.00140
-175.14%
MNSTK
0.00007
-0.00011
161.38%
-0.02104*
-0.01056
-99.28%
DIVYLD
0.00187*
0.00188*
0.72%
0.00292*
0.00106**
-175.99%
EARVOL
-0.02439
-0.02691
9.36%
-0.16614*
0.03399
588.79%
AVGRET
-1.40567
-1.284***
-9.48%
5.54962*
-5.64400*
198.33%
RELPERM
0.00288
0.00291
0.70%
0.01375*
0.01045*
-31.55%
CFPERM
0.03236*** 0.03195***
-1.27%
0.07305*
0.10900*
32.98%
DBETA
0.00915*
0.00917*
0.20%
-0.00061
-0.00360
83.02%
Wi
-0.0008
-0.0737*
F-statistic
10.510*
11.190*
17.990*
17.460*
2
Adjusted R
0.056
0.056
0.117
0.107
Sample Size
2423
1931
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively
1 Note: Although the coefficients are rounded to zero the percentage differences reflect the change in the
actual and not rounded coefficients (hence, non-zero percentage differences).

From equations (3a) and (4a) in the earlier development of the structural model a
negative (positive) coefficient on this selectivity adjustment variable for the repurchasing
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(dividend) sample indicates that the firm is better off choosing this form of disbursement,
compared with the alternative, on the expectation of a higher wealth effect.
At this preliminary stage then, it would appear that the repurchasing firms exhibit
a severe sample selection bias, and are in fact making their disbursement decisions in the
best interests of their stockholders. The abnormal returns equation seems fairly well
specified, with an adjusted R2 value of 11.7 percent and with most of the variables being
statistically significant. For the open market repurchase sample DEPS, RVOL, TOBINQ,
SIZE, MNSTK, DIVYLD, EARVOL, AVGRET, RELPERM, and CFPERM are
significantly related to the abnormal returns indicating that asymmetric
information/signaling, undervaluation, managerial incentives, financial flexibility, and
cash flow permanence also provide insight into the observed stock price reaction.
From these results I want to argue that there is a significant selection bias in the
sample of repurchasing firms, and that any analysis ignoring the selection process will
produce misleading results. This indicates that when firms elect to repurchase their stock,
they do so because they gain more, other things being equal, than if they had instead
utilized a dividend increase for the cash distribution.
Table 11 report results for the abnormal returns equations for the special
dividends and repurchase tender offer firms. While qualitatively similar, the results are,
nevertheless, statistically much weaker than the results reported for the dividend
increasing and open market repurchasing firms.
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Table 11. Comparison of Selection (ML) Model and OLS Coefficient Estimates: Special
Dividends and Repurchase Tender Offers
Results for the ML regressions with self-selectivity adjustment variable and OLS regressions without the selectivity
adjustment. The dependent variable is the 3-day CAR around the disbursement announcement. Variables measured are: DEPS
is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the residual volatility in
daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994);
FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile
takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt
to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK
is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the
average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating
income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year
preceding the announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior
to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three
years before and after the announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; and Wi is
the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills Ratio). Significance of independent variables are tested using standard t-tests.

Parameter Estimates
Special Dividends Sample

Repurchase Tender Offers Sample

Independent
Variables

ML
(Selection)

OLS

% ∆ in
Coeff.

CONSTANT
DEPS
RVOL
TOBINQ
FCF
TKOVER

0.13529
0.06383***
1.38201*
0.00007
0.01628
-0.02390

0.15800*
0.06068***
1.19400*
0.00188
0.01663
-0.02679

14.38%
-5.19%
-15.75%
96.08%
2.12%
10.77%

1

ML
(Selection)

OLS

-0.22246** 0.11500
-0.00160
-0.00283
0.60784
-0.18300
-0.01756
-0.00483
0.00199
0.00782
0.05539*** 0.02497

% ∆ in
Coeff.
293.44%
43.61%
432.15%
-263.65%
74.53%
-121.82%

LTDEQ
0.00000
0.00000
-114.59%
0.00000
0.00001
79.87%
SIZE
-0.00676
-0.00838*
19.37%
0.00858
-0.00455
288.45%
MNSTK
-0.01021
-0.02224
54.10%
0.06950** 0.00337
-1963.48%
DIVYLD
0.00083
0.00099*
16.28%
-0.00560** -0.00178
-215.39%
EARVOL
0.07367
0.05706
-29.10%
0.05986
0.01333
-349.03%
AVGRET
-4.09968
-3.32800
-23.19%
-5.03856
0.49600
1115.84%
RELPERM
-0.00310
-0.00281
-10.15%
-0.00494
0.01022
148.31%
CFPERM
-0.10693
-0.10900
1.90%
0.09088
0.00688
-1221.71%
DBETA
-0.01762** -0.01818**
3.08%
0.00496
-0.00345
243.85%
Wi
-0.0192
0.1015*
F-statistic
4.240*
4.110*
1.500**
0.830
2
Adjusted R
0.135
0.122
0.033
0.011
Sample Size
313
222
* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively
1 Note: Although the coefficients are rounded to zero the percentage differences reflect the change in the
actual and not rounded coefficients (hence, non-zero percentage differences).
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I find that the selectivity variable is statistically significant for the repurchasing
firms but not for the firms using special dividends. The selectivity variable on the
repurchase equation is positive, however, and not negative as expected. This indicates
that while sample selection exists, it implies that the firms are actually making decisions
to the detriment of their stockholders. That is, the shareholders would in fact have been
better off if the firms had issued special dividends instead of repurchasing their stock.
This observation requires further research, particularly in light of the recent corporate
scandals of the late 1990s and early 200s involving such firms as Enron, Tyco, and
WorldCom, among others.
Only DEPS, RVOL and DBETA (all related to information signaling theory) are
found to have a statistically significant relationship with the abnormal returns on
announcement of special dividends. However, the sign on the coefficient of DBETA is
opposite to what was expected. For the firms utilizing repurchase tender offers
TKOVER, MNSTK and DIVYLD are the only variables having statistically significant
coefficients. However, for both sub-samples the F-statistics are statistically significant
indicating that the overall models for explaining the abnormal returns are useful. Other
factors that have not been accounted for are the major drivers in explaining the market’s
reaction to special dividends and tender offer repurchase announcements.
One possible alternative explanation is provided by Bagwell (1992) with respect
to the stock market price reaction to repurchase tender offers. He documents that firms
face upward-sloping supply curves when they repurchase shares in a Dutch auction. His
analysis concludes that to repurchase its shares, a firm must offer a premium above its
pre-announcement market price. Hence, the observed price increase on announcement
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may merely be a movement along an upward-sloping supply curve. However, in this
study I am primarily concerned with the relationship between the firm’s cash disbursement
choice (dividend versus stock repurchase) and the impact of that choice on share prices.
Hence, while this alternative rationale for the observed stock price reaction to a stock
repurchase is valid, the tests utilized in addressing my primary hypothesis are not designed
specifically to differentiate between the effects of these various theories. Bagwell’s (1992)
results, therefore, in no way invalidate the general findings of the present study.

4.2.3

Comparison of Actual and Predicted Abnormal Returns

The primary hypothesis being examined was whether managers are making their
disbursement decisions in the best interests of the firm’s stockholders. Additional insight into
this question is provided by examining the difference between the mean abnormal returns for
firms that made a particular disbursement choice and the mean predicted abnormal return for
those firms had they chosen the alternate method. The result of this analysis is provided in
Table 12 and further support our earlier conclusions.
Panel A indicates that for dividend increasing firms, the actual abnormal returns on
announcement of their payout choice was statistically significantly lower than if they had
made the alternate disbursement. For open market stock repurchasing firms, the actual
abnormal returns on announcement of their payout choice was statistically significantly
higher than if they had utilized dividends.
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This indicates that for these firms, the choice consistently maximized returns to their
shareholders. I am, however, not able to conclusively support the hypothesis of stockholder
wealth maximizing behavior for firms that choose to increase their dividends.

Table 12. Comparison of Actual Excess Returns Upon Disbursement Announcement and
Predicted Excess Returns for Alternate Payout Method
Results comparing the actual CAR upon announcement of a dividend or repurchase and the predicted CAR if the firm in
question had used the alternative payout method (that is, if the firm that paid dividends had instead repurchased its stock).
Significance of results are tested using standard t-tests (t-statistics are in brackets).

Sample
Size

Actual CAR

Predicted CAR for
alternative payout choice

Difference between actual
and predicted CAR

Panel A: Dividend Increases and Open Market Repurchases
All Firms

4354

0.01380*
(14.70)

0.05132*
(81.75)

-0.037512*
(-32.90)*

Dividend Increases

2423

0.00835*
(9.52)

0.08336*
(206.29)

-0.07501*
(-81.71)

Open Mkt. Repurchases

1931

0.02065*
(11.49)

0.01110*
(22.62)

0.00954*
(5.32)

Panel B: Special Dividends and Repurchase Tender Offers
All Firms

535

0.03071*
(8.82)

-0.03486*
(-5.81)

0.06558*
(9.104)

Special Dividends

313

0.03306*
(6.91)

-0.09836*
(-17.55)

0.13143*
(16.74)

Rep. Tender Offers

222

0.0274*
(5.49)

0.05466*
(5.93)

-0.02726**
(-2.56)

* (**) - Statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level respectively

Panel B of Table 12 report on the difference between the mean abnormal returns for
firms that utilized special dividends and repurchase tender offers and the mean predicted
abnormal return for those firms had they chosen the alternate payout method. Firms utilizing
special dividends are found to be maximizing stockholder wealth (as measured by the
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resulting announcement period abnormal returns) in their disbursement choice. In contrast,
firms repurchasing their stock could have been better off if they had instead paid a special
dividend (the difference between the actual and predicted abnormal returns is statistically
significant and negative). This result is somewhat puzzling given that tender offer
repurchases have traditionally elicited a higher stock market reaction than special dividends.
Closer examination, however, reveals that our results may be sample specific, as the average
abnormal returns for our sample of dividend payers (3.29 percent) is higher than that for the
repurchasing firms (2.71 percent).
An alternative explanation of this anomaly is provided by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, &
Skinner (2000) who document that while in recent years there has been a dramatic overall
decline in special dividend payments, the incidence of very large special dividends has
increased and has not been displaced by stock repurchases. Concurrently, as reported by
Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach (2000), the incidence and value of tender offer
repurchases has shown a marked decline in the 1990s. Whereas tender offer repurchases
were primarily used as takeover defenses and for leveraged recapitalizations, in more recent
times there have been more privately negotiated transactions. The mean abnormal return for
the special dividend sub-sample is larger in the post 1990 period compared with the pre 1990
period (the difference is not statistically significant) while the mean abnormal return is
smaller in the post 1990 period (statistically significant difference) for the tender offer
repurchase sub-sample. There has thus been a shift in corporate payout policy during the
sample period which tends to shed some doubt on the actual substitutability of special
dividends and tender offer stock repurchases.
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4.2.4

Structural Form Probit Equations

Further insight into the primary research question is provided from an examination of
the structural form probit models presented in Table 13. The structural form probit equations
include an explanatory variable measuring the expected gain from utilizing dividends
relative to repurchasing stock (BENEFIT), allowing for consistent estimation of the model.
The model is also statistically identified since the abnormal return equation included at least
one predetermined variable (DBETA) that is not included in the structural form.
The results for the dividend increasing and open market stock repurchasing sample
reinforce our preliminary conclusions on managerial motivation in disbursement choice. The
coefficient on BENEFIT is positive as expected but not statistically significant. The fact that
we found selectivity bias in only the repurchase sub-sample could explain this lack of
significance. Further research decomposing the sub-samples and analyzing them
independently may shed light on this puzzling issue. Additionally, the coefficients on all the
variables, with the exception of DEPS and CFPERM, have the hypothesized signs.
Similarly, all the predetermined variables that were statistically significant in the reduced
form probit remain statistically significant. This indicates that wealth maximization is not the
only factor affecting the choice of disbursement. Instead, issues of asymmetric information,
signaling, undervaluation, agency, financing cost, managerial incentives, clientele, financial
flexibility, and cash flow permanence also have an impact on the decision, supporting the
conclusions of earlier research in this area.
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Table 13. Structural Form Probit Models Predicting the Choice of Disbursement
Results for the probit maximum likelihood decision models (with dependent variable I=1 for dividends and 0 for
repurchases). DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; RVOL is the
residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung
and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994); TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if
the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0 otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of
Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior
to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction of the total number of shares
outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the announcement; EARVOL is the
standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to the announcement; AVGRET is
the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of
permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the announcement; CFPERM is the difference in the average ratio of cash
flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the announcement; and BENEFIT is the difference
between the predicted CAR for a dividend payout and a stock repurchase.

Dividend Increases versus
Open Market Repurchases

Variable

Special Dividends versus
Repurchase Tender Offers

CONSTANT

2.45617*

2.77110***

DEPS

0.03796

-0.67622***

RVOL

-34.52300*

TOBINQ

-14.59780**

0.18279*

FCF

0.21259***

0.38702*

TKOVER
LTDEQ

0.07948

-0.14241

-0.25662

0.00027

0.00022

SIZE

-0.08102*

-0.14060**

MNSTK

-0.39769*

-0.94729**

DIVYLD

0.04094*

0.02930

EARVOL

-6.82179*

-0.85271

AVGRET

325.82200*

35.34110

0.24561*

0.06100

-0.83811**

-0.02464

RELPERM
CFPERM
BENEFIT
Chi-Squared

6.18198

2.88970

773.33*

101.39*

0.4937

0.6296

% Correctly Classified

67.73

69.16

Sample Size

4354

535

2

Pseudo R

* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively.

The results for the special dividend and tender offer repurchase sample also
strengthen our preliminary inferences. The BENEFIT variable has a positive coefficient as
expected, but it is also not statistically significant. Otherwise, the qualitative results are
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similar to that found for the sample of dividend increases and open market repurchases. The
indication, therefore, is that while the maximization of stockholder wealth may result from
the firm’s disbursement choice, that choice is primarily driven by concerns as to signaling,
asymmetric information, undervaluation, corporate control, financing cost, managerial
incentives, and the firm’s stockholder clientele.

4.3

Model Specification/Robustness Test

The adjustments for sample selection bias that I have utilized in this study have been
found to be very sensitive to the assumption of normality (see Maddala (1991)). As a
consequence, and in the absence of utilizing more generalized distributions or semiparametric methods, I run two alternate specifications of the model as a test of the robustness
of the results presented earlier. These are estimated for the sample of dividend increasing and
open-market repurchasing firms. The alternative models are formulated by alternating the
variables introduced to proxy for signaling, financial flexibility, and cash flow permanence,
respectively. That is, along with the other variables used, one model includes only DEPS,
EARVOL, and RELPERM, while the other includes RVOL, AVGRET, and CFPERM,
respectively. I present the results for these two alternative specifications of the model in
Table 14 and Table 15.
For both alternative model specifications the general results remain qualitatively
similar to that presented in our full model. In both cases the coefficients on the variables in
the reduced probit models have similar signs and statistical significance as was observed
earlier. The only exception to this is the SIZE variable in Model 1 which has the opposite
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sign to that found in our original model. The same is true of the abnormal returns regression
equations. In the case of the dividend increasing firms, for both alternative model
specifications, MNSTK is the only variable with a sign different to that reported earlier.

Table 14. Robustness Test with Alternate Model Specification - Model 1
Results for the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the structural equations with alternate
specifications. DEPS is the change in the annual EPS subsequent to the announcement scaled by the stock price; TOBINQ is
Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994);
TKOVER is a dummy variable (=1 if the firm faces hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the announcement, =0
otherwise); LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the market
value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a fraction
of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the
announcement; EARVOL is the standard deviation in the ratio of operating income to total assets over the five years up to the
announcement; RELPERM measures the relative proportion of permanent cash flows over the three years prior to the
announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; BENEFIT is the difference between
the predicted CAR for a dividend payout and a stock repurchase; and Wi is the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills
Ratio).

Variable

Reduced
Probit

Dividend
Regression

CONSTANT
DEPS
TOBINQ
FCF
TKOVER
LTDEQ
SIZE
MNSTK
DIVYLD
EARVOL
RELPERM
DBETA
BENEFIT
Wi

-0.88635*
0.29225
0.13139*
0.32403*
-0.17557
0.00015
0.04021*
-0.25719*
0.05213*
-6.38829*
0.24963*
0.10716*
---

0.00819
0.03964*
0.00403*
0.01127***
-0.01029
0.00000***
-0.00195*
-0.00877***
0.00294*
-0.20246*
0.01033**
0.01103*
-0.03739*

374.34*
0.4392
64.56
4354

11.96*
0.0515
-2423

1

Chi-Squared / F
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R2
% Correctly Classified
Sample Size
2

Repurchase
Regression
0.09539*
-0.00177
-0.00572*
-0.01391*
-0.00950
0.00001
-0.00787*
0.00436
-0.00276*
0.37396*
0.00656*
-0.01076*
--0.08062*
10.66*
0.0567
-1931

* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively.
1
Chi-Squared is calculated for the probit equations and the F-statistic for the regression equations.
2
Pseudo R2 is presented for the probit equations and the Adjusted R2 for the regression equations.
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Structural
Probit
-0.15740
-0.07653
0.11026*
0.37569*
-0.06390
0.00031
0.00041
-0.20676*
0.02275**
-4.31607*
0.11528**
-5.06056*
-374.34*
0.4392
64.56
4354

Table 15. Robustness Test with Alternate Model Specification - Model 2
Results for the Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) estimation of the structural equations with alternate
specifications. RVOL is the residual volatility in daily stock returns in the year preceding the announcement; TOBINQ is
Tobin’s Q as defined by Chung and Pruitt (1994); FCF is free cash flow as used in Maquiera and Megginson (1994);
TKOVER is a dummy variable representing the firm’s facing hostile takeover activity within a year prior to the
announcement; LTDEQ is the percentage of Total Long Term Debt to Stockholder’s Equity; SIZE is the natural log of the
market value of the firm’s equity 5 days prior to the event day; MNSTK is the number of shares reserved for conversion as a
fraction of the total number of shares outstanding; DIVYLD (in %) is the average dividend yield for the three years up to the
announcement; AVGRET is the average daily stock return in the year preceding the announcement; CFPERM is the
difference in the average ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets in the three years before and after the
announcement; DBETA is the change in systematic risk subsequent to the announcement; BENEFIT is the difference between
the predicted CAR for a dividend payout and a stock repurchase; and Wi is the selectivity adjustment term (the Inverse Mills
Ratio).

Variable
CONSTANT
RVOL
TOBINQ
FCF
TKOVER
LTDEQ
SIZE
MNSTK
DIVYLD
AVGRET
CFPERM
DBETA
BENEFIT
Wi
1

Chi-Squared / F
Pseudo R2/Adjusted R2
% Correctly Classified
Sample Size
2

Reduced
Probit

Dividend
Regression

1.88858*
-45.16500*
0.08489*
0.29336*
-0.10057
0.00017
-0.05536*
-0.29865*
0.03180*
268.13500*
-0.85002*
0.04863
---

0.04009*
0.62441
0.00088
0.00418
-0.00927
0.00000
-0.00235*
-0.00005
0.00183*
-1.29396
0.04052*
0.00918*
--0.00070

697.63*
0.4773
67.48
4354

10.88*
0.0467
-2423

Repurchase
Regression
0.11396*
0.48334*
0.00887*
0.00553
-0.02086
0.00001
-0.00307**
-0.02313*
0.00286*
5.90997*
0.07414*
-0.00096
--0.07397*

Structural
Probit
2.13742*
-40.39370*
0.14503*
0.33707*
-0.18054
0.00024
-0.05775*
-0.43176*
0.03864*
323.22300*
-0.69677***
-5.92056
--

21.47*
0.1129
-1931

697.63*
0.4773
67.48
4354

* (**) (***) - Statistically significant at the 1 (5) (10) % level respectively.
1
Chi-Squared is calculated for the probit equations and the F-statistic for the regression equations.
2
Pseudo R2 is presented for the probit equations and the Adjusted R2 for the regression equations.

However, in the case of Model 1, the selectivity variable is now statistically
significant (and positive as expected). For the sub-sample of repurchasing firms, Model 1
exhibits the greatest departure from the results reported earlier. The coefficients on FCF,
MNSTK, and EARVOL have opposite signs to those reported in our full model and all are
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statistically significant. However, the selectivity variable remains statistically significant and
has the correct negative sign in both Model 1 and Model 2. As this is the major focus of the
model the other departures are not cause for major concern.
Turning our attention to the structural probit equations, the general results,
qualitatively, are identical to that found in our original model. All the variables that were
statistically significant continue to exhibit such characteristic and only DEPS and SIZE in
Model 1 have coefficients of a different sign than was reported earlier. However, while the
BENEFIT variable continues to have a positive sign in both alternative model specifications,
it is now statistically significant in Model 1. I would, thus, conclude that the earlier results do
not appear to be driven by the model specification, but are, in fact, quite robust to alternative
specifications of the structural equations.

4.4

Summary

In this chapter, I have presented the results of all the statistical analyses undertaken,
together with an interpretation of these results in the context of the present research
hypotheses. I conducted the study primarily to examine the specific hypothesis mentioned
earlier in section 3.1.
Some evidence was provided to reject the null hypotheses that managers do not
discriminate in their choice of a payout method (albeit, primarily for the sample of firms that
repurchase their stock). Specifically, the selectivity models provide support for and
strengthen the argument that self-selection bias is a critical factor in studying the motivations
for firms’ disbursement choices. Dividend paying and stock repurchasing firms display
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significant differences in firm characteristics. Further, firms do not appear to randomly
choose between the various disbursement choices. In the case of firms utilizing open-market
stock repurchases, the observed choice of disbursement method is the result of a deliberate
and specific decision made by the firm in the interest of maximizing the wealth position of
its stockholders (based on the specific characteristics of the firm). The stock market then
reflects these choices when it assesses the firm’s value on announcement of the distribution.
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Chapter 5
Research Summary and Conclusions

The primary goal of this research was to empirically examine the disbursement
choices made by managers. The main research question is whether firms choose specific
cash distribution methods, based on explicit firm characteristics, so as to maximize their
stockholders wealth position. The research is motivated by a need to resolve competing
theoretical motivations for the various forms of cash distributions, particularly given the
differing observed stock market wealth effect resulting from the disbursement
announcements. Previous studies, for the most part, do not allow unbiased comparisons of
the alternative disbursement mechanisms, as they examine each distribution method
independently without considering their potential interactions. My analyses avoids this
potential sample selection bias by integrating and examining simultaneously (i) firms that
increase their regular cash dividends and firms that initiate open market stock repurchase
programs, and (ii) firms that announce specially designated dividends and those that
undertake repurchase tender offers.
Many of the propositions and conclusions drawn from previous studies in this area
are supported by my results. In accord with Ofer and Thakor (1987) and Persons (1995), I
find that the level of asymmetric information (extent of undervaluation) has an impact on the
payout choice. Jagannathan, Stephens, and Weisbach’s (2000) and Guay and Harford’s
(2000) hypotheses that the financial flexibility inherent in stock repurchases contributes to
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the choice of payout method used by firms and that the permanence of the firm’s cash flows
are important in this choice are also supported (primarily as regards the choice between a
dividend increase and an open market stock repurchase). Fenn and Liang (2000) concluded
that the extent to which management stock options are available influences the choice and
suggest that the growth in stock options may help to explain the rise in repurchases at the
expense of dividends. My results also support this view.
While the above research conclusions were drawn from independent examination of
the differing motivations, my results stem from jointly analyzing the various motivations and
simultaneously allowing for the impact of a stockholder wealth maximization incentive on
the decision. Consequently, the self-selectivity models provide results suggesting that firms
do not randomly assign themselves to disbursement methods. Instead, the choice of a
disbursement method is optimally made, with respect to firms choosing to utilize open
market stock repurchases, and is reflected in the reaction of the stock market to the firm’s
distribution announcement. I find that even in the presence of asymmetric information,
agency costs, and differing expected stock price reactions to the various mechanisms of cash
disbursements, these firms, on average, choose the cash distribution method that maximizes
the expected gain associated with the distribution. Hence, managers utilizing open market
stock repurchases, on average, make stockholder wealth maximizing disbursement choices,
notwithstanding the influence of other factors on the payout decision. Similar results were
inconclusive with regard to firms choosing to utilize dividends, while those firms using
repurchase tender offers were found to be making decisions detrimental to the welfare of
their stockholders.
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The acute self-selection problem identified suggests that previous researchers have
overstated the expected market responses to disbursement announcements made by a firm
chosen at random. The approach used in this study thus provides a more complete
understanding of the ex-ante information content of stock repurchases and dividend
distributions, while also revealing significant discriminatory factors that influence the firm’s
choice of a specific disbursement method.
Although this study has provided additional insights on the rationales for the various
disbursement methods, and thereby contributed to the existing literature in this area of
research, much still remains to be done to completely understand and model managerial
decision making and incentives.
Future extensions of this research lie in utilizing the limited dependent /qualitative
variables methodology (modeled in this study by an endogenous switching regression) in
extending standard event-study methodology used in previous research on disbursement
mechanisms. The importance in recognizing the existence of self-selection is that it leads to
non-random samples and hence biased inferences when standard event-study methodology is
applied. The limited dependent/qualitative variables model provides a direct test for selfselectivity bias and thus produces a more complete description of the ex-ante information
content and returns distribution process for cash disbursements. Additionally, the model can
be extended to the analysis of any corporate event where potential self-selectivity exists.
Another interesting extension lies in investigating the disbursement decisions of
managers across different markets. This would be an attempt to assess whether the results
and conclusions arrived at in the present research applies across the various markets. This
could also provide additional insights into the differences and similarities between the major
89

stock markets. Given the results of this study, which implies some differentiation in the
motivation for open market stock repurchases and repurchase tender offers, it would also be
interesting to more closely analyze the choice between these two forms of stock repurchases.
In summary, I have attempted to provide in this chapter a general overview of the
motivation for, research questions examined, and interpretation of results obtained from this
research. I have also sought to highlight the important contributions of this study and suggest
future opportunities for research extending the present work.
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Endnotes

1.

Except for the tax-clientele theories, early research into this question treated stock
repurchases and dividends as equivalent mechanisms for cash payout to
stockholders.

2.

Empirical findings indicate that firms are unlikely to increase dividends unless they
perceive that the increased dividend can be maintained. See for example Miller and
Rock (1985), Ofer and Siegel (1987), and Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994).

3.

DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2000) indicate to the contrary that firms have
typically paid specials almost as predictably as they paid regular dividends, with
the exception of very large specials (equal or exceed 5% of equity value).

4.

The model utilized in this study assumes that the choice is mutually exclusive.
Thus, firm either pay dividends or repurchase their stock, but not both. For this
reason, any firm that simultaneously paid dividends and repurchased its stock was
excluded from my sample.

5.

The reaction to open-market repurchases is significantly lower than that to tenderoffers -- 4 percent compared to between 7 percent to 15 percent [see Masulis
(1980a), Vermaelen (1981), and Stephenson (1994)]. This observation also
applies to dividends, with the reaction to special dividends averaging 1 percent,
dividend increases 1 percent to 2 percent, and dividend initiations 3 percent to 4
percent [see Brickley (1983), Denis, Denis, and Sarin (1994), and Reynolds
(1994)].

6.

Ofer and Thakor (1987), Barclay and Smith (1988), and Hausch and Seward
(1993), provide only partial explanations for this phenomenon.

7.

Extracted from Table I, Barclay and Smith (1988, p.62). The remaining 5 percent
of firms is divided approximately equally between the firms that utilized special
dividends and those that neither paid dividends nor repurchased stock over the period
covered by their study.

8.

Modern finance theory has shown that in perfect markets capital structure does
not affect firm value. Value is determined solely by the earning potential of the
firm’s assets.

9.

In performing this test their sample was limited to 2,068 of the original 6,777
dividend change announcements – including 1,865 dividend increases and 203
dividend decreases.

10.

Further empirical support for the clientele hypothesis is provided by Denis, Denis,
and Sarin (1994), as discussed earlier in section 2.1.1.1.
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11.

See Vermaelen (1984), Ofer and Thakor (1987), and Comment and Jarrell (1991).

12.

Ofer and Thakor, ibid., pg. 386.

13.

See Maddala (1983), pg. 223 et seq. for a more detailed treatment of the model.

14.

This is a necessary correction for the conditional expectation given that we have
non-random selection, that is, certain units from the underlying population do not
appear in a random sample due to their individual disbursement choice.

15.

CRSP provides a single composite index incorporating all firms on NYSE,
AMEX, and NASDAQ.

16.

Notwithstanding, results of all the above statistical tests are reported after reestimating the market model (more specifically the systematic risk component, β)
using the methodology proposed by Scholes and Williams (1977). As reported in
Fowler and Rorke (1983), the re-estimated beta is given by the following, shown to
be a consistent estimator:
p lim β$ i =

(β

−1
i

+βi+β
0

(1 + 2 ρ )

)

+1
i

1

where:

β i−1 =
β i0 =

the parameter estimate obtained from the simple regression of Rit against Rmt-1
the parameter estimate obtained from the synchronous simple regression

β i+1 =

the parameter estimate obtained from the simple regression of Rit against Rmt+1

ρ1 =

the first order serial correlation coefficient for the market index, Rm

17.

Eliminating small dividend changes would also minimize problems arising from
misspecification in the model of expected dividends since large dividend changes
are likely to be categorized as dividend surprises regardless of the expectation
model employed.

18.

See Damodaran (2001) Figure 21.6, page 663.

19.

There were 59 firms that announced both a dividend increase and an open market
repurchase program while one firm announced a tender offer and a special
dividend simultaneously.

20.

Financial firms are consistently omitted from similar studies primarily because
their repurchases are not consistently reported (Fenn and Liang, 2001), (Fama and
French, 2001). Heavily regulated firms (utilities and telephone companies) are
omitted because their payout policies may be significantly affected by their
regulated status (Fenn and Liang, 2001).

21.

See Ofer and Thakor (1987) for a theoretical justification of this observation.

22.

Data on hostile takeover target announcements are taken from the Securities Data
Company database.
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23.

The solution to the selection bias problem, as outlined in Maddala (1991),
requires that there be at least one exogenous variable affecting selection that does
not appear in the structural equation. DBETA was excluded from the structural
equation as there was no extant theoretical research justifying its inclusion.

24.

Even in the presence of multicollinearity the regression estimates will still be
unbiased and consistent. The effect of multicollinearity is that the coefficient
estimates will tend to have large standard errors, causing us to increasingly accept
the null hypothesis of a zero coefficient and thereby increasing the probability of
a Type II error.

25.

See endnote 4 from Chapter 1.

26.

The results in Tables 7 and 8 are consistent regardless of the methodology used and
appear quite robust. Adjusting beta for non-synchronous trading using the Scholes
and Williams (1977) methodology has no noticeable impact on the qualitative
results. As a consequence, all the remaining statistical analyses utilized the standard
market model cumulative abnormal returns and ignored the Scholes-Williams beta
adjustment, since the results would be qualitatively identical. The estimated
abnormal returns calculated with and without the non-synchronous trading
adjustment are almost perfectly positively correlated (correlation coefficient of 0.995
for the sample of dividend increases and open market repurchases and 0.998 for the
sample of special dividends and repurchase tender offers)

99

About the Author
Noel Reynolds received a Bachelor’s Degree in 1986 and a Master’s Degree in
1988, both in Accounting, from the University of the West Indies, Jamaica. After
completing the Master’s program, he started teaching as an Assistant Lecturer in Finance
and Accounting at the University of the West Indies until 1990. He then went on to private
practice, being employed to KPMG Peat Marwick and Partners, Jamaica as a Financial
Management Consultant until he entered the Ph.D. program at the University of South
Florida in 1992.
While in the Ph.D. program at the University of South Florida, Mr. Reynolds was
very active in the Caribbean Cultural Exchange Club, serving as Vice-President between
1994 and 1996. During this time he was also inducted into the national honor societies of
Phi Kappa Phi and the Financial Management Association. Mr. Reynolds has also served as
discussant at meetings of the Southern Finance Association.

